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CHAPTER
THE PROBLEM:

I

STATEMENT AND JUSTIFICATION

As long as education is considered a form
of association with free beings who are basically
unpredictable in their ireedom, then we have much
to learn
from the existentialist.

Freedom is more than a political phenomenon.

It

cuts deeply into the nature of man and his
predicament on
earth.

For to be human means to be separated from what
we

were in order to approach or return to what we
are going to
be in the future.

The free condition gives life dignity and

resonance and makes possible what would be meaningless without freedom:

birth.

love, hope, despair, journeying home and re-

But it also makes possible naaa, mass-man, Don No

One, the flight from freedom and authenticity, that condi-

tion over which so many social scientists in the twentieth
century have expressed alarm.
A great number of these social scientists would

agree with Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey when they say,
"the critical problem toward which all the behavioral sci-

ences must be directed is how man can remain an individual
in society. "1

David Riesman has written much on the other-

directed man who yields to the group rather than maintain
3-Dav.id Krech, Richard Crutchfield, and Egerton
Ballachey, Individual in Society p. 529.
,

2

the burden of an inner-directed independence. 2

Rollo May,

who has written prolifically on loneliness and
freedom,
says, "We are anxious because we do not know
what roles to

pursue, what principles for action to believe in. "3

Again,

Rollo May, echoing hrich Fromm, "Authoritarianism
in reli-

gion and science, let alone politics, is becoming
increasingly accepted, not particularly because so many people

explicitly believe in it, but because they feel themselves
individually powerless and anxious ."^

More concretely,

Robert Jay Lifton writes of the almost wholesale flight from

responsibility

,

"One searches in vain for a man or a group

of men who will come forward to take the blame or even iden-

tify a human source or responsibility for what took place
[at Mylai],

.

.

."3

Erich Fromm notes the pervasiveness of

the feeling of insignificance and powerlessness among indi-

viduals and their consequent escapes from themselves and

from the freedom that involves a dreadful responsibility.^
George Spindler notices the change from traditional values

which asserted the sacredness of the individual to emergent
p

David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd .

3ro11o May, Man's Search for Himself

^Ibid .
view

,

,

p.

,

p.

33*

51.

^Robert Jay Lifton, "Beyond Atrocity," Saturday Re March 29, 1971, p. 25.

^Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom

.

3

values which stress sociability
and conformity to the group.?
Wylie Sypher traces the loss of self
and proclaims, "We do
not have to read contemporary
literature to know that we are
living in an age of togetherness,
that Americans have accepted their own special kind of
collectivism, as it appears

m

the life of the organization man,
whose existence is a
mode of conforming to large enterprise." 8
Charles Reich
writes in a recent and much reviewed
book,
01 llfe does man live under
the dominann ox the corporate
tion
state? It is the life that
was foreseen in The Cabinet of Dr. Cali ra H
e ropoxis
and M, a robot life, in which man
is
epnved of his own being and he becomes
instead
a mere role, occupation, or function.^
•

,

Tillich says that in the contemporary process
that is going
on people are being "transformed into things,
into pieces of
reality which pure science can calculate and
technical science can control." 10

m

My own understanding of the massacres

Vietnam is that in order to shoot women and children
there

muot not be some "center" of himself that says automatically
and spontaneously to a man:

I do not do

these things!

There

must not have been for the men who participated in it a cen-

ter of their being or core which defined boundaries.
^George D. Spindler, "Education in a Transforming
Amei ican Culture," in Education and Culture, ed. bv Geore*e
6
Spindler, pp. 132-172.
a

and Art

~

Wylie Sypher, Loss of the Self in Modern Literature
,

p. 9.

9 Charles Reich,

The Greening of America

,

10 Paul Tillich, The Courage to
Be , p. 137.

p.

121.
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It is not the intent of this paper to examine in

depth the complex reasons behind this void at the center or

the loss of the self*

There does exast today a massive and

pervasive assault on the individual’s existence as an authentic human being.

Many institutions participate along with

myths in this assault on man.

Jules Henry names advertising

as one, "Advertising is an expression of an irrational

economy that has depended for survival on a fantastically

high standard of living incorporated into the American mind
as a moral imperative." 11

Ortega locates the fault in

technology,
.
technology for all its being a .practically
.
.
unlimited capacity will irretrievably empty the
lives of those who are resolved to stake* everything on their faith in it and it alone. .
Just because of its promise of unlimited possibilities, technology is an empty form like the
most formalistic logic and is unable to determine
the content of life. That is why our time, being
the most intensely technical, is also the emptiest
in all human history. 12
.

Related to technology and perhaps growing out of it is modern man’s extraordinary faith in the expert.

Raup writes,

Few things are more fraught with danger than this
current trend of thought that would place the responsibility for social management in the lap of
the expert and the executive. As social frustrationsincreases not only do people tend to look
favorably upon the man of action, but the stature

11 Jules Henry, C ulture Against Man

12 0rtega, Mana s

,

May 15, p. 1.

,

p.

45*

,
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increa S ^$3

rt

"the

aan 0f

Pledge-bends

to

Couple this with the belief of
many investigators that
most
people would relinquish the
provisions of the bill of rights
without too much anguish and
indeed the situation is fraught
with danger. The implications
concerning the viability
of

a democratic society are
enormous.

There are, of course, other
explanations for the
loss of self in modern society
including the fractionalization of people’s lives, specialization
of work roles, breakdown of the family, the abstract
nature of modern
life, etc.

Again, it is not the purpose of this
paper to deal primarily
with those factors which promote alienation,
loss of self,
and inauthenticity but rather to search
for some philosophical framework within which to comprehend
and confront the
phenomena of the loss of self and to investigate
and suggest
ways and the extent to which education can play
a part in

remedying the dilemma.
Existential philosophers especially address themselves to this dilemma of the free man and the
search for

authenticity.

More directly and more eloquently than any

other group of philosophers, they are concerned with
the

’'I,"

the central core of being, the ground of being, the ’’thou"
of human relationships.

Existentialist philosophers and

y^Bruce Raup, The Improvement of Practical Intelligence.

pp. 18-20.
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writers as a group are most critical
of the systems, institutions, and technologies that
endeavor to destroy the essential human qualities and disrupt
man’s authentic relation to
the world.
Strain says, "In terms of its
content, modern
existential thinking focuses on the
human person in a technological and scientific age. The
institutional organization of science, by and for the state,
has dehumanized man. ”14
Ralph Harper says that existentialism
is the only philosophy
that takes the concrete self and its
situation seriously
enough to make it the subject of its
inquiry. 15

Leroy

Trouther, speaking of Tillich’s interest
in existentialism,
writes, "As Tillich suggests, it is the
threat of an infinite loss the loss of their 'authentic
self'
that drives
the existentialists to their attack. "I*
Suggesting that

—

interest in Existentialism is growing, Trouther
has written,
"The existential thinker as well as today's
college student

struggle for the preservation of the person, for
the self

affirmation of the self, in a situation in which the self
is
more and more lost in its world. "17
+PaUl Strain

470-471

'

Certainly central to

Modern Philosophies of Education

,

pp.

15Ralph Harper, "Existentialism and Recognition," Modof Education Fifty-fourth Yearbook of the
National Society fortHe Study of Education, Part
1, p. 227 .
e rn..Philosophies

1 ^’Paul

.

Tillich, The Courage to Be

.

p.

137.

l^Leroy Trouther, "What Can the Educator Learn from
the Existential Philosopher?" Philosophy of“ Education Year~~
book, p. lor.
-
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all the existentialists is the
passionate conviction that
the individual in his moment of
existence is paramount. Any
system, organisation, group, methodology,
or goal which subordinates the individual human must be
attacked. At a time
when technology and management and
manipulation are so pervasive and rampant, persons must be
strong and "present" and
grounded in order that these forces be
transcended.

From the above it would seem automatic
that since
the goals of existentialist philosophers
coincide perfectly
with the goals of public education in a democracy,
namely
that the individual and his fullest actualization

is of su-

preme importance, that hence much of what
existential philosophers have written would have been examined for
their

educational implications.

Such is not the case, however.

Trouther notes in a reaction to this lack, "Today
existential
philosophy represents an intellectual force of such magnitude that American educators can no longer afford the luxury
of ignoring it." 18

Besides ignoring these thinkers we seem

more attracted to philosophies and solutions which stand

completely opposite to existentialists.

For example, Dr.

James McConnell, a professor of psychology from the University of Michigan writes:

believe that the day has come when we can combine
sensory deprivation with drugs, hypnosis, and astute
manipulation of reward and punishment to gain almost
I

18 Ibid

.

,

p.

102.
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abs°l u te control over an individual's
behavior.
be Possible then to achieve a
very rapid
and highly elective type of positive
brainwashing
that would allow us to make dramatic
person s behavior and personality. 19 changes in a
Such behavioristic, stimulus-responses,
Lockean ways of
thinking are not lacking today. In their
utopian zealousness such thinkers seem never to ask the
most crucial question, the one which existential philosophers
never stop
asking: what is it that is distinctively
human in human
behavior? Educational practices which are
not drawn from
the confrontation of this question are
therefore anti-human.
It is the purpose of this investigation
to move through this

question via existentialist philosophers and then
to appropriate or make meanings for education.
A review of the literature in education which appro-

priates such insights would include George Kneller's small

book entitled Existentialism and Education

Van Cleeve Morris

.

has written some forty pages on existentialism in his Philoso -

phy ir the American School .

Pritzkau has written recently

another slim book which heavily uses the language of existen-

tialism called On Education for the Authentic

.

Articles on

the general topic of existentialism and its implications for

education have been written by Theodore Bramfield, Ralph
Harper,

V..

R.

Niblett.

Leroy Troutner has written a disser-

tation entitled, "Educational Implications of Existentialism:

ames McConnell

Manas, May 20, p.

5

.
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An Analysis and Comparison of Martin
Heidegger and John
Dewey. " Otto Bollnow and Eduard
Spranger have written a
great deal in this area, but little
is available in translation from the original German.
Maxine Greene has edited
with some commentary a small but useful
book called Exis t ential Encounters for Teachers
.
Ernest W. Dillon has

written a fine dissertation called
"Development of an English
Education Course from an Examination of the
Existential Concept of Authentic Existence." 20
At this point I'd like to offer some
detailed justi-

fications for an existential look at education.
A.

Emphasis- on Technique.

The emphasis on technique

and on "systematic arrangements" both in society
in general
and in schooling in particular has encapsulated
man to the
point where he "is" the system.

This emphasis has blinded

modern man to the vacuum of ends.

This phenomenon is dis-

tinctively American and is probably related to the frontier
and our pragmatic successes in creating a vast industrial
on

Theodore Bramfield, "Existentialism and Education,"
Edu c at 10 n a 1 The ory II (April, 1952)
Leroy Trouther, "Educational Implications of Existentialism: An Analysis and
Comparison oi Martin Heidegger and John Dewey" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford Univ.
1962); Ralph Harper,
"Existentialism and Recognition," Modern Philosophies of Edu cation , Filty— iourth Yearbook oi the National Society for
the Study of Education, Part 1; W. R. Niblett, "On Existentialism and Education, British Journal of Educational Studies
II (May, 1954); Otto Bollnow, "Risk and Failure in Education,"
in Modern Philosophies in Educatio n; Eduard Spranger, "The
Role of Love In Education ," in Modern Philosophies in Educa tion E. V/. Dillon, "Development of an English Education
Course. ..." (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University, 1968).
,

;

,

;

.

10

society.

In education, this encapsulation is seen
in the

single-minded search for the solutions to school
problems in
^J.r an ^ eilg, nt .s. «
.

Modular scheduling, differentiated staffing,

team-teaching, audio-visual programs, behavioral
objectives,

performance contracting, simulation games, etc.

By arrange-

ments here is meant in fact all of the patterns,
controls,

segmenting of tasks, ordered routines, schedules, and cur-

ricula which taken together contribute to a fashioning of
teachers and students in the following directions!
1.
2.

3.

teachers and students assume roles and seoarate
from each other,
the teacher's function becomes primarily one of
taking students through training patterns,
since the learning process consists of roles
which define and locate teachers and students,
questions which would extend meanings and identity do not get asked, such as: Who am I and
what do I value about myself as I confront with
people? What is meant when someone says that I
am the teacher? When people say this do they
mean I can really be a teacher, or that I must
conform to the plan designed for me? Is the
role of teacher merely to fulfill requirements?
But is that me— myself?

The existentialist philosopher would believe that such "ar-

rangements" have brought man loneliness and alienation rather

than peace and progress.

The institutional arrangements of

modern life, including, of course, the school, are dehumanizing man, destroying the essential human qualities, and are

disrupting man's authentic relation to the world.
B.

Science and the scientific view of man that per-

meates modern education is too reductionist, and they call
into need a broader, mere empirical, more inclusive understand-

11

ing of learning and growth and what constitutes
a man's
journey through life. It is not less empirical to

let into

our understanding of learning and growth the insights
of art
and literature. There is more truth about learning
and growing and "connecting" to what is real in Siddhartha
than in

most if not all adolescent psychology books.

Our difficulty

with it is that its knowledge comes to us in a different
mode.

We must somehow come to terms with the reductionist

limitations of the scientific mode which pervade our under-

standing of man and invade our notions of education.

We must

discover what it means to consider the "wholeness and completeness" of man.

Jacques Maritain has said that, "The

primary aim of education in the broadest sense of that word
is to 'form a man' or rather to help a child of man attain

his full formation or his 'completeness as a man.’"

What

educator can deny the relevance of the question, "What is

man in his existential wholeness"?

And it is the existen-

tialists who can help us here, for they have always known
that literature and art can reveal more of the human condi-

tion and do it with emotional impact.

And, furthermore, do

it in a way that doesn't narrow and close down but opens up

into mystery, wonder, and chance.
C.

Education has traditionally avoided what Buber

has termed the "between."

Because education has been a re-

flection of the prevailing cultural values, it has emphasized an impersonal, I-It style in school.

The question of

12

the "other," the meaning of the
"other," and the encounter
of the "other" are recurring
themes in existential literature,
Achieving the "between" is not merely
a matter of
deciding between lectures and seminars,
classes or individual
study:
these are merely playing with
"arrangements" again
and are false ways of stating the
problem. All of us have

participated in discussions which were
useless and have
attended lectures where the lecturer seems
to draw us into
an implicit dialogue with him in such a
way that the meanings he brings to us activate the meanings
we bring
to the

hearing of his.

A study of existentialism will help us
in

understanding the nature of that flow of meaning,
or as Howe
calls it, "the dialogical principle. "21
D.

dicaments:

Education seems bent on avoiding the human preanguish, aloneness, ecstasy, impotence, love,

hate, and freedom.

words as the above.

It does this by avoiding even using such

But more than that, students are bored

at least in part because instead of schools touching
levels

of being deep within persons, there is constant bombardment

of trivia.

Silberman has recently written eloquently and

bitterly about the schools' immersion in trivia. 22

-j_

difficult to appropriate existential meanings or to make

existential meaning from trivia, anu impossible through
2lReuel Howe, The Miracle of Dialogue

.

pp
^Charles
Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom.

s
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immersion

m

trivia to touch one's own resonance
and the
resonance of life!
There is a second sense in which
schools
avoid existential encounter and it js
through fostering reliance on external authority and control.
Much of schooling

promises that in order to exist one has only
to depend on
others rather than oneself, to give up
responsibility, to
risk nothing, to avoid failure:
freedom.

in Fromm's words, to escape

It is difficult here, too, to appropriate
existen-

tial meanings.

To put it another way, it is unlikely
that

one will connect with his own "ground of being"
if one is

encouraged constantly to "have his being for others."

Donald

Vandenberg says this from a strong existential framework:
The use of commanding/obeying tactics on the part
bhe teacher increases the extent of the puDil's
having his being xor others, which increases his
alienation from the world, which makes him more
in-authentically there ... it promotes the illusion, that the reasons of other people are his own,
and it does not help him establish his own reasons
for being there.
But such separation does make good soldiers, both uniformed

and civilian

.

.

.

All these forms and variations of separation that

have been described do not tell of something new in the world.
The opposite of separation is "home" and coming home is the
oldest journey we know, perhaps the only one.

Existentialism,

has always been concerned with the search for self, for human

23ponald Vandenberg, "Learning as Co-Disclosure," in
Teaching and Learning p. 149 •
,

14

meanings, and the "way home."

If we do not, especially in

school, concern ourselves with the idea of
human meanings

and the existential journey, and if we do not
become better
at understanding the subtle but extraordinary
difficulties

modern living throws in the path of the young as
they search
for the way, we will all then continue to serve
false
gods

instead of the cause of life.
Summary
The design of this paper then will be to investigate
in depth three existential philosophers:

Karl Jaspers, and Martin Buber.

Gabriel Marcel,

To then- ascertain where the

commonalities exist in the area of human authenticity.

To

then relate these insights to education in an attempt to
clear some spaces for an existential education.
In this chapter the purpose and rationale of the

study has been outlined.

The gap between the realities of

school practices and the insights into human authenticity by

existential philosophers has been stated.
The second chapter will deal with the existential

ideas and posture of Karl Jaspers with particular attention

paid to the many ways the modern world reduces man.
The third chapter will explore in the same manner

the ideas of Gabriel Marcel with particular attention to his

notions of participation and mystery.
Chapter four will explain the inherent difficulties

15

and dangers in objectifying existentialism
into programs and
curriculum.

Chapter five will draw heavily on the
ideas of Martin
Buber in developing the area of dialogical
teaching.
The

ideas of Jaspers and Marcel will also
be used here since
Buber's I-Thou relationship contains and
envelops Jaspers'

transcendence and Marcel's mystery and
participation.
The sixth chapter will be an attempt at
curricular-

izing one existential idea, namely death,
and justifying its
presence and usefulness as content in education.
Here again,
the chapter will draw from Jaspers' limit
situations, Marcel's
presence to mystery, and Buber's eternal Thou.
The seventh and concluding chapter will be a
discus-

sion of imaginative literature as a tool to uncover
the exis-

tential self and make contact with the metaphysics of human
motivation.
ment ,

Chapter seven will contain a concluding state-
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CHAPTER
KARL JASPERS:

II

THE TRANSCENDENCE OF DASEIN

Karl Jaspers was much concerned with
a person’s
existential freedom, for in his own life
he had not found
any institution or profession that
could satisfactorily answer the important philosophical question,
"How to live?"
Jaspers tells us of the philosopher Schelling
who wrote that,
"although man, at the beginning of his
existence, finds himself thrown, as it were, into a stream that
overpowers him
completely, still he is not required to allow
this stream to
simply wrench him loose and carry him along
passively like
an inanimate object." 2 ^ Without his
consent he is brought

into a world that he does not understand.

good life?

How to live the

This knowledge is gained only with exDerience.

But from what agencies can he learn, and are these agencies

reliable?

in brief, how is a member of our civilization to

find out how to live?
Jaspers talks at length about three agencies and the
role they play in aiding people to deal with their philo-

sopnioal questions:

the state and its

lav/s,

religion and

the churches, and psychiatry.

^Schelling, Werke, XIII,
Jaspers

,

p.

Charles Wallraff, p. 66.

202,

quoted in Karl

17

1*

-^ e State and Its Laws As
Guides

There have always been those who profess
that obedience to authority and/or tradition is the
only way to good
citizenship and political stability.
Sophocles’ Creon in
Antigone represents this view illuminated
by his metaphoric
insistence of himself as captain of a ship
which must steer
a straight and deliberate course or
else chaos will prevail.
Descartes who, content in practical life simply
to accept
the demands of religious and secular authorities,
said, "In

questions of action,

I

am guided by the state and the customs

of the country , by the example of the best among
my fellow
men, and by resoluteness.

25

Hegel has asserted that virtue

is not a troubling oneself about a peculiar and
isolated morality of one’s own; that a striving
for a positive morality of one's own is futile,
in its very nature impossible of attainment;
that in respect of morality the saving of the wisest
men of antiquity is the only one which is true, that
to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral
tradition of one's country . . .26

However, we live in a time and knowledge that makes this

point of view difficult:

we have been witness to state atroci-

ties both democratic and totalitarian; we see the state’s

inability to provide for changes which occur today at such a

discouraging pace; we note the state’s inability to foresee
the results of advancing technology which the state itself

^Descartes, Three Essays
J aspers ,

Charles

V/

,

p.

156,

quoted in Karl

allr af f , p . 6 7

2 ^IIegel,

Philosophische Abhandlu ngere, Werke I, pp.
399-400, quoted in Karl Jaspers Charles Wallraff, p. 67.
,

,
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supports:

as early as 1932 Jaspers wrote:

"While we cannot

as yet show how it could be done, it
is by no means unthinkable that man will eventually prove
capable of exploding the
entire earth, leaving behind only a cloud
of dust drifting

through the universe"; 27 we’re beginning
to understand that
there are limits to a planned society, that
man must pay for
this conformity and obedience a heavy price:

his moral

aut onomy

2.

Religion

To Jaspers, however much the church may have
achieved

(and of this there can be no doubt), still, when
the two

millenia of its history are impartially viewed, it turns
out
to have been no more trustworthy or honorable than the state.
It has been neither a good counselor nor a good example.

In

fact, it has been repeatedly unreasonable, mistaken, dishonest, scheming, power-hungry, unscrupulous,

and hyp

o

critical. 2S

Not the least among the things that make Christianity unpal-

atable and useless to many who seek answers to existential

questions is that unlike some other religions, Christianity

presupposes that it has a monopoly on the truth by which one
should live, and asserts that "it alone not only can make a

universally valid claim, but is actually universal (Catholic;.
2 7philosophie

.

Vol. I, p.

3.18,

quoted in Karl Jaspers .

Charles Wallraff, p. 70.

2&Charles Wallraff, Karl Jaspers

,

p.

77

19

Anything less that lays claim to be
equally unconditional
2<
is untruth, blindness, wickedness
?
.

j as p ers

believed,

however:

"Only when the poisonous claim to
exclusiveness
is laid aside can biblical belief
.
.
.
actualize its true
nature. "30 "For noble men
and the pure in soul are quite
discernible outside of Christianity; it
would be absurd for
them to be lost, particularly if we
compare them with certain of the most conspicuous Christians
in history, who have
been none too lovable or admirable in any
human sense. "31

Wallraff points out in addition,
But more important still, exclusiveness means
intolerance,
and intolerance "stands forever in
2
readiness to kindle new fires in which to burn
heretics." Because intolerance against intolerance (but only against intolerance) is indispensable; intolerance against the exclusivist claim
is necessary when it not only propounds a
doctrine
for consideration by others, but strives to force
it on others by law, by compulsory schools,
etc. 3

There are, of course, other reasons why the church
is denied by many as a source of day-to-day wisdom:

its use

of power, its threats of eternal death, its war-like charac-

ter from the very beginning, its actions and interpretations
based on special pleading rather than on what was spiritually
2 9 per

Jaspers:

Philosophische Glaube . p. 83 quoted in Karl
An Introduction to His Philosophy Charles Wallraff,
,

.

3° Per Philosophische Glaube
p. 508, quoted in Karl
.

Jaspers , Charles Wallraff, p. cO.

33-Karl Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy , p. 69
3

Ibid .

,

pp. 94-9 5.

.
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right and morally just for man.

Today there is even a seri

ous crisis in keeping the priesthood
intact, so many are
walking away. For the rest? Jaspers says
of his futile
attempts to communicate.
It is among the sorrows of my life
spent in the

searcn for truth, that discussion with
always dries up at crucial points; they theologians
fall
lent, state an incomprehensible proposition, sispeak
f something else, make some categoric
statement,
engage
amiable talk . . . and in the last analysis they are not really interested.
.
.
People
-ike us . . . strike them as merely stubborn. 33

m

.

Revealed religion, "where prayer, a cult, and
revelation
establish a community and give rise to authority,
theology,
and obedience, "34 p s dishonest and hypocritical.

To Jaspers,

philosophy offered another prospect,
Every individual experiences an inner conflict between the desire for obedience with repudiation of
independent responsibility on the one hand, and
the urge to be free from creeds, cults, and authorities on the otner.
ihis decision between religion
and philosophy cannot be avoided unless one is willing to remain in the shady indefiniteness of apathy
and indifference. 3
But this choice for freedom presents a challenge:
The liberation which the way of philosophy offers
is not easy, because it provides no tangible evidence, no guarantee, and no court of appeal capable
of providing or pronouncing a final judgment.
To
enter the company of philosophic minds means to have
thereafter no example to follow; no authority to
rely on, no truth to be passively received, and no
‘

33 lbid., p. 77.
3^-Philos ophie,

p.

Wallraff, p. 63.
35ibid., p. 301.

296,

quoted in Karl Jaspers, Charles
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historically given revelation to
provide salvation
e v/ho philosophizes must
confirm everything for
always taking full responsibility.
No one
receives him into the realm of
philosophic
v
°
Ulnas
mindsp
the venture is his own.3o
>

Psychiatry (H 2 O is Not the Same As Water)

3*

Jaspers considered psychiatry as
another example of
theoretical dogma. Though he admitted
that the psychoanalytical school brought to light certain
scientific facts, he made
a devastating criticism of its
implications for science and
for the human being. He accuses it of
making man into the
marionette of his unconscious drives, 37
self-reflection degraded into a mechanical hunt for sexual
impulses and childhood experiences. Jaspers violently disagreed
with this
attempt to localize the source of man's being
and action.
The psychoanalytical school presupposed they
had a total

knowledge of man and were able to project the nature
of man.
To Jaspers the being of man cannot be exhausted by
even
the

best theory,
anyt- hing

what was most fundamental in man was beyond

that could be established and fixe d about him and

^hat__could provide a set basis for prediction and clinical

p ractice .

In viewing man there must always be respect for

the uncertainty surrounding the question as to what man really
is.

Man is always more than what can be known about him.
3 6 V on

der Wahrhei t. p. 965, quoted in Karl Jaspers.
Charles Wallraff , pp. §4-#5.

37p i e Geistege Situation der Zeih. quoted in Knuasen,
Idea of Transcendence p.
,

If
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certain possibilities are realized in him,
a description of
these possibilities is not a description
of what man is, for
man is always the possibility of realizing
something else. 38

Richard Graubau wrotes on psychology:

Informing the whole procedure is the subject-object
structure 01 awareness. A psychological
method,
which consists of assumptions, concepts, and
techniques of observation and experimentation,
is a wav
of investigating an object.
The object, a human
being, is never exhausted by the method.
.
The
psychological account oi man yields many partial
pictures, each of which is the result of the
application of a method— determining leading idea.39
.

.

Jaspers makes a distinction between "understanding"
(verstehende) and "explaining"

(

erkl'arende) psychology.

Explaining psychology is bent on causal explanation of

psychological aata.

Jaspers points out,

".

.

.

since these

are psychic events, which by their very nature have to re—
quaxitati've,

such quantification would as a matter of

principle remain impossible without losing the actual of the
inquiry.

Understanding psychology seeks insight into the
meaningful structures which connect psychic phenomena, not
causally, but intentionally.

A denial of understanding is

always possible in the interest of the neatness of mechanical
explanation.
3

But it would be an example of a self-closing

^AIlgemeine Psychopathologie

.

quoted in Knudsen, p. 6.

3%. Graubau, Existential Philosophers,
p.

ed. bv Schrader,

148.

^Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology (University of
Chicago Press, 1963), p. 302.
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world view.^1

To understand psychological material
is to

participate in the larger world of which the
material is a
part.
It is to be existentially aware of the
person's way
of being-in-the-world.

Since it refuses to accept the level

of Dasein as total, Jaspers' aims at a
transcending psychology.

Jaspers believes that the question of man must
always
be asked; but scientific inquiry must learn
to pause before
the infinity of man and scientific technique must
admit its

inherent reductionism.

Hence the question "how to live 9 "

must be directed elsewhere.
To Jaspers, the proper starting point is personal

experience as it is given to the person in the immediate
experience of his concrete situation.

beginning

•

•

of philosophy.

•

and only form of reality.

returns to it."* 4 2
-

•

•

"The situation is the
It is for me the one

•

My thinking starts from it and

This is clearly understood in the context

of Jaspers' levels of being.

One level is Dasein (being-

there)

Dasein is the simple "being-there" of empirical
reality, the pure givenness of the temporal and physical
world.
I

As Jaspers says, "the world of Dasein is the world.

myself am Dasein as far as

^R.
p.

I

am an empirical being. "A-3

Graubau, Existential PhilosoDhers, ed. bv Schrader.

14 a.
^'

2 Karl

Jaspers, Philosoohie , Vol. I., quoted in
Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt p. 180.
,

4-3

.

ibid .

,

p.

181.

.

.
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Casein would be the quantitative
parts of a person that can
be easily collected and subjected
to statistical analysis.
It is that revel which the
scientist and the behaviorist
are
concerned with, but which is dangerous
at the point when
they insist that there is nothing
but this.
Jaspers' use of the term Dasein
is both similar and
different from Heidegger’s. The
similarity occurs in their

conceptions of authentic and inauthentic
existence. To
Heidegger, human existence,
being-in-the-world, is Dasein,
and realizes itself either authentically
by resolution or
inauthentically by losing itself in the
everyday world of
Das Man. Jaspers conceives of Dasein
as empirical being-inthe-world, man considered as an object;
hence, to live only
in the world of Dasein is to live
inauthentically. Authenticity to Jaspers involves choice and
openness and freedom
and Exist enz.

Dasein or possible existence realises itself in
free
existential choice. The person gains an awareness
of his

existence in free choice.
ence.

...

’’Freedom is the being of exist-

In the act of choice

spontaneity of my freedom

...

.

I

first time as my own true self. "44

.

.

,

in the original

recognize myself for the
In free choice, a person

breaks out of the limitations of Dasein and chooses
himself.
.uxistenz, the next level of existence for Jaspers,
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is the being that I am, through this
freedom to choose oneself.
As Casein I am not Existenz but
only possible Existenz.
Existenz can never be the object of
knowledge.

«

It is a

level of being beyond Dasein.
To Jaspers the level of being beyond
Dasein is impossible to approach from an empirical
route. He elucidates
in Philosophi e:
If everything that cognitive orientation
the form oi universally and necessarily yields in
valid
knowledge is to be called "world," then the
question arises as to whether being extends
beyond the
wor d, and thought beyond orientation within
the
world,
ihe soul and God or Existenz and Transcendence as we say when we exchange the ianeuace
of mythology for that of philosophy— lie
outside
° r ld #
e cannot know them in the sense
in
u
u
which
we know things within the world. . . . Although uhey are not known, they are not nothing
• •

—

T/ r

'•

'

•

.46

Existenz is not an object; it is not accessible to
scientific
approach; it is the uninvestigatable self; it is
Antigone

1

s

driving source, it is the source of Camus' hero who rises
up
and says no, it is a mystery especially to the unpossessing,
"it is only real to those in whom it develops and reaches

fruition from an inner source" ;47 it is inaccessible
to

psychological understanding and psychological guidance, for
they cannot answer the question of why Antigone must bury
her brother or why Socrates refuses to placate the jury.
45 ibid .

,

p. I 83

46 philosophie

,

.

Vol. II, p. 1, quoted in Karl Jaspers,

Charles Wallraff , p. 96 .
47 philosophie Vol. I, p. 242, quoted in Karl Jaspers
Charles Wallraff, p. 96,
,

,
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What iS recJ uired here is not a
scientific study of the psyche
but an illumination of Exist enz.
Exist enz is uniqueness and singularity.

unrepeatability of the individual.^ 8

It is the

It is the op p osite of

the personna or mask or role which
is played or behaviors and
costumes which society prescribes.
It is not just a process
within the 'world but a source from beyond
that makes its
appearance within the world .• *+9
d
1S not a possession but
a possibility held in abeyance
whenever ordinary habit patterns assume control of our conduct in
the everyday world.
Jaspers raises hard questions about education
for Existenz
when he says that it is not a goal but a
source and cannot
be aimed at by a methodological procedure.
One does not say,
.

"I intend to existieren from this moment
on."

goal but a source. "50

"It is not a

Pointing the way for Maslow's self-

actualized man and Fromm’s authentic man, Jaspers
says,
Existenz does not issue in the arbitrary caprice of anarchical behavior but in the highest moral decisions ."51
’Since it underlies the self-identity that makes possible

responsible behavior (e.g. reliability in connection with

promises and contracts, incorruptibility, undeviating
4o pe-q philosophische Glaube
pp. 118-119, quoted in
.
Karl Jaspers . Charles VJallraff, p. 100.
49 Ibid.
SO philosophie , Vol. II, p.
5,
Charles Wallraif, p. 101.
51
^
Ibid..

,

p. 4.

quoted in Karl Jaspers.
‘
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loyalty), it expressions contrast
sharply with the momentto-moment existence of animalian man. "52

While a person is the free choices
he makes, there
is always risk and uncertainty
in choices.
Thus the exercise of freedom is pervaded by
dread. Surely this is the
reason why people remain on the level
of Casein.
The definitions and objectification of Dasein
avoid the existential
dread of choosing oneself.
"There is no freedom without the
threat of possible despair.
"53
,
T
p
Jaspers
also says, "He who
wants to be true must take the risk of
erring and of placing
himself in the wrong. "54 In a
statement which would oer _
tainly place Jaspers in the midst of today's
vitriolic dialogue, he says, "Existential choice is not
obedience to an

objectively formulated imperative (dasein), but
obedience to
an internal imperative (existens)." Authenticity
means genuine free choice of self that opens the person
to Transcendence.
Freedom:

I

Am Less Free But Closer To Home!

It was nooed before that,

"Existence does not issue

in the arbitrary caprice of anarchical behavior
but in the

_ 5 2Ipn der Wahrheit , p. 83 , quoted in Karl Jaspers.1
Wallraif pi lul.
1

,

53Reinhardt, the Existentialist Revolt , p. 196.
54-Karl Jaspers, Philosophic
Vol. II, quoted in
Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt , p. 201.*
,
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highest moral decisions."55

Paradoxically ther£

hint here not of freedom but
of necessity.
up a bit and approach carefully.

^

&

But let us back

Jaspers seems to strongly identify
Existenz with
freedom. "While living beings are
simply there empirically,
Existenz has its being in freedom. "56
It is nQt the goal
but the source of philosophizing,
a source to which I transcend when I come to myself
philosophically. "Existenz
is

constantly confronted by the choice
of being or not being.
I am only in the earnestness
of decision. "57 The
approach
to Existenz, then, must begin with
freedom.

However, since

Jaspers shifts the meaning of Existenz
to freedom then freedom like Existenz is indefinable.
Neither language nor science nor philosophy can answer the
existential questions
that all people ask, "What is being?"
"What does it mean to
state that the world .is or that I am?"
As we have seen, Dasein is not Existenz.

cal self is a reduction necessarily.

My empiri-

Psychology and psycho-

logical analyses of myself are examples of Dasein.

I

realizee

Existenz when, in my search for a secure anchor of
being
recognize that it is my own concrete self, my immediate
55 phixosophie
..
Wallraff , p. 103.

,

pp# 2 -4,

quo
tea in Karl Jaspers.
"
1

56 Ibid., p. 2.
57 per Philosoohische Glaube
p. 118,
.
Jaspers , Wallraff , p. 103.

quoted in Karl
'

I
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experience which contains the key to
Existenz. "My own concrete self in . . . the situation is
the beginning ... of
philosophy. ... It is for me the one
and only form of
reality. . . . My thinking starts from
it and returns to
it."5B To Jaspers the
personal concrete experience is the
hidden ground of oneself, that which never
becomes
an object

and which therefore can neither be rationally
known nor conceptually defined. It is the origin out of
which I think
and act and of which in rare moments of
insight I am indubi-

tably certain.

And when I act out of this certitude which

grows out of my very being, in this act of
choice, on this
"original spontaneity of my freedom ... I
recognize myself
for the first time as my own true self." 59
0 nly in those

moments when

I

exercise this free act of choice am

I

fully

myself and feel the certitude of absolute being; no
abstract
intellectual operations nor any emotional, sentimental, or
instinctive impulses can ever impart to me a comparable experience.

my Dasein.

in deciding I break one of the limitations of
ihis act of freedom is the beginning and source

and origin of my true personal authenticity.

"Existence

creates itself in this act fertilizing the desert of being

with the lifeblood of personality. "6l

^ Philosophic

I,

p. 3.

59 Philosophie II,

^Reinhardt, Existentialist Revolt
6l Ibid .

,

p.

1$2.

,

p.

81.

p.

180.
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And freedom carries with i +
ts own
certitude: not in the cogito
(I
bu
}
n the
eligo (I choose) lies the
guarantee of
So that the Cogito. ereo
®? lst ence.
am) of Descartes becomts
a^ElLf
therefore I am) in the formulatfoA
Se ’
of Jao^ri *62 °

V

“rL

Over and over again in third
force psychology we
come upon the paradox of necessity
in f™.Hnn
And in
Jaspers again, we have the idea
that freedom presupposes
a
law, that a human act of
freedom is impossible without
a
law. In fact Reinhardt says
that this law "is the indispensable condition of my freedom . "63
This law ±e an inter _
nal, personal law rather than
an external, universal
norm.

Existential choice is not obedience
to an objectively formulated imperative but my obedience
to an internal imperative.
It is Bruno choosing to burn at
the stake rather than yield
to the demands of the Inquisition,
or Luther saying,
"Here

stand; I cannot do otherwise."

I

Here freedom is united with

necessity and choice seems beyond the control
of the individual. And it is at this point that
we

are close to Jaspers*

idea of Transcendence.

Transcendence
The world stubbornly resists objectification
as if
this stubbornness were a testimony of an elusive
and transcendent being.

Jaspers* entire philosophy is directed toward finding
an ultimate ground which is beyond the objective,
and thus
6 ^ Ibid

.,

p.

182.

63 Ibid

.,

p.

182.
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beyond any generality under which something
could be subsumed.
He want s to discover a ground which
will be

out of

the reach of what are for him the inevitable
disintegrating
effects of endless reflection. His goal
is to always make
philosophy yield more than meaningless
fragmentation.
The world, to Jaspers, can never be
articulated into
a complete system.
Completeness remains, at best, an idea.
This incompleteness is itself taken as a
sign of Transcendence.

For when consciousness seeks the common
denominator

for all of reality, it finds itself before the
void.
is no common denominator for all of reality.

There

Being and mean-

ing Cannoo be regained except by the transcendence
to that

which is above understanding.

The sense of Exist enz is de-

pendent upon the breakdown of the attempt of consciousness
to find a concentration point within that which is
known.

The

shattering of the attempt to find the concentration ooint by

way of thought is a necessary moment in Jaspers* method .
It is only in this "shipwreck" that the true direction to the

self and to Being itseli is opened.

It is only because one

has tried to find a handhold in thought and failed that he
can enter into that tension that can yield Transcendence.

To

choose this tension requires freedom and freedom is made pos-

sible by a hidden God, one who speaks ambiguously.
It must be pointed out that Transcendence is not an—

6^-Knudsen, I dea of Transcendence in the Philosophy of
Karl Jaspers , p. 179*
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other word for God.

The experience of Being
can only come
through the realization of
self-insufficiency. This realization Jaspers calls Shipwreck.

X
liBdt,

0

V

rwall IgaLst\*ich ly coinL Sit T atiOn
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see that^they ar e>
0
not'cLpletrenoSgreve^to^u^
tiiy my actions objectivelv
J'Tn
grasp my freedom, my limit^y
1
1 -’

IjusU^SKy!^

Boundary-Situations
These boundary situations,
like all existential references, are not objectively
demonstrable; they must be lived
through. To one who is conscious
of it in his very being
as

Existenz, and accepts it and
appropriates it and does not
try to escape it by objectifying
it, it gives life its existential quality*
Some boundary situations put to
question the very
meaning of Existenz. They are: death,
suffering, conflict,
and guilt. Death, when appropriated
existentially as my
death or experienced as the death of
one with whom I have
been in communication, rather than just
as an objective event
which happens to people, raises the
question about the significance of life and the destiny of
personal existence.
Death points up the finitude of our being,
and this finitude
occasions decision: we do not have an infinity
of chances or

phers

,

6 ^ Philo sophie
p. 723 t quoted in Existential Philoso.
_
ecu 5y E chrader p. i40.
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an infinity of time to utilize them.

We can irretrievably

lose ourselves and die without ever having
lived.

In this

situation, an honest appropriation stimulates
us to sort out
the important from the trivial and to
decide between them.
.

Richard Graubau writes:
Death is a limit or boundary to Exist enz.
... It
brings us to a brink; we must decide how to
take
it, y.hat to do in the face of death which
points
up tne fact that we must give ourlives meaning
and
^^nat it is not written objectively in the
>
scheme of things. Death presents a challenge to
living:
we are called upon in its presence to determine how we shall live considering that we are
*
•
•
However i may instead dissipate my
life in redoubled efforts to cover up death and
secure my lii e in the world. • . . Freedom comes to
the fore in the face of death. 66
(The subject of death as a limit situation and its
presence

in school curriculum will be discussed in a separate
section.)

Similarly, conflict, suffering, and guilt function as

boundary situations when the limits and the ambiguities of
life become apparent, when the answers

’’are

not written ob-

jectively in the scheme of things,” as they never are.

What

makes us most human is not simply the necessity of choicemaking:

even animals choose.

The crucial aspect is aware-

ness of the limits and boundaries we face in choice-making,

awareness of the precariousness of life in the world.

Suffer-

ing, for example, reveals our inability to achieve finality

in temporal extension.

Conflict shows that communication may

^^Richard Graubau, Existential Philosophers
George Schrader, Jr., p. 41.

,

ed. by
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never quite succeed, there is no objective
guarantee in the
nature of things that it can overcome the
hostilities between
man.
And guilt comes from the failure to
realize all of one's
possibilities. And guilt is part of our lot.
Not only be-

cause we never actualize all our potential
but, in addition,
our actions have unintended consequences.
As Kant pointed
out, we are never without corrupting even
the purest motives
by considerations of the "dear self." These
are limit situations and must be faced in order to live
authentically according to existentialists. And facing them means
facing one's
choices, the problematics of freedom, the
indeterminateness
of living and choosing:

it means becoming concretely aware

of being human.

The Enemies of Authentic Existenz

Jaspers in his Dook, Man

m

the Modern Age , sharoly

analyzed and criticized the present age and in so doing gives
us a graphic portrayal of his view of inauthentic man.

He sees, as others do, technology radically altering

the conditions of modern life.^

Population has increased

and life has been increasingly organized and standardized.
Life now is dominated by a vast web of apparatus in which

millions of human individuals perform regular and machinelike functions.

The tendency has been to mechanize and

°^Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age , p. 34.
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standardize not only routine acts that
maintain the system,
but human thought and life itself.
Philo Pritzkau writes of
the tendency toward "arrangements"
especially as it relates
to education:
The external authority is constantly
putting people and what they do into involved in
ordered aren
Teachers
placed in thesHrrangem^ff
ments. Th*
They are trained to find their
place he?e
and_to train others to do likewise.
The design is
n
Ve people in training tasks so
completely
tha- ?hpere 13 n ° ^^ lme
question where they are or
what the> are about. Perhaps the
first picture
that comes to mind as
a person thinks about being
a he
the b0xlike container which is the 5
di! i
i
c assrooins •
Along with this are the
various^att
various patterned
prn
arrangements in the forms of
S
wo b ° oks ’ manuals, courses of study
ii' of
and so nn°*
on all
which contribute to the fashionC ne
ln the ways of conducting "school.''
Coupled with this are the various controls
which
establish the heirarchy of communication
channels,
the segmentation of tasks, the ordered
routine, the
unquestioned sequential arrangements, and the
dividing oi people into working compartments.
[All
arej ... involved in a meaningless routine.

^

^

Vl

'i

:

?

_

All these arrangements merely result in people
being taken

through training patterns.
that precludes awareness.

They encase the mind in a way
The reasoning seems to be that

the more man can view himself as an object (dasein) in
the
world, as a part of the system, the more smoothly the
whole

technology will run.
It is quite obvious that in the conditions just de-

scribed, neither authentic meanings nor Existenz can thrive.

Jaspers says, "Tne masses are our masters and for everyone
68 Philo Pritzkau, On Education for
the Authentic

,

p.

2.
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who looks facts in the face, his
existence has become dependent on them, so that the thought of
them must control
his doings, his cares, his duties.
."69 Free dom in
.
Existens involves a burden and anguish,
and so most surrender to the machine-like and perform
regularly their routinlzed functions. And in the process,
we split off from our
own concrete situations, become separated
from our own being
James Herndon describes such a splitting
off into a Dasein
mode of existence when he describes a
parent who came to
visit him about his son's difficulties in
school:
0pe ed U P verT fiercely by informing me
P
that he knew the
boy needed discipline, that he
was willing to do his part, followed with a
list
1 P
1
ninents he was P re P ar ed to inflict and
said
? had
^ !f i?
1
his permission to be tough, to belt the kid
around when he needed it, and so on. He was accepting a role which is pretty familiar to teachdp is what they mean when they write Parents
Cooperative on cumulative folders . . . .
I told him that those punishments weren’t anything new, were they? Hadn't he and the boy's
teachers agreed every year, and hadn't they belted
him and restricted him and kept him after school
and isolated him and xorbade TV and made him sit
two hours in his room every night to study and sent
him to the office and paddled him and suspended him
for seven years of school days and wasn't it clear
that however wonderful and cooperative those plans
were, that they hadn't worked?
Yes.
He recalled that in kindergarten the boy
spent an entire half year just sitting in the office, never being allowed to go to class or out to
recess, because he was so bad. Then he said
harshly. How can a kid that young be that bad? and
burst into tears. It was a great relief to both
of us.
After a bit vie vie re able to talk about our
own school days and how we didn't always dig them
nor tne scnool us, and that we guessed vie vie re
.

.

—

6^Karl Jaspers, Man in

the Modern Age , p. 40.
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both making it O.K. as adults no
matter what the
school might have thought of us, and
then he said
thought the kid was a pretty good
id if a little wild and stubborn
maybe, and how
he even t nought him a pretty smart
kid and how
il9 ?A tn gy. £ Qt along to g ether working or goiyy~ nvit
..

-

.

t ettTng t hems e 1 ves~~go~out^
e
and by believing his boy to be stupid
and bad. 70

So much for the power of training
patterns, objective existence (dasein), and having one's being for
someone else, except to note that Jaspers urges all to
resist the tendency
to view themselves as objects and to resist
the dehumanizing

trends by resolutely defining themselves by
free choices.
He says, "the basic problem of our time is
whether an independent human being in his self-comprehended
destiny is still
possible, "71

;
'

°James Herndon, How to Survive in Your Native Land,

pp. 112-113.
7-*-Karl

Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age

,

p.

241.
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CHAPTER

III

GABRIEL MARCEL

Perhaps _th e ultimate question
whether beinpS iq
ldentmed with truth or with is
reverence.
One of the difficulties in
reading Marcel like other
existentialists is his rejection of
logical, official, and
technical vocabulary. Rather he
embraces a dialogical,

anti-digmatic attitude and a reliance
upon the situation of
the dialogue in which one person
joins with another in a
common inquiry. Both Marcel's
journals and his dramas are
examples of his invitation to common
inquiry.

Thus his style

becomes his philosophy:

open, dialogical, questioning,
non-

logical, unsystematic, non-reductive—
in other words, human.

Marcel believes that man is mystery; that
is, when
he is not violated and distorted by the
many forms by

which

reduction occurs in modern society.

Any philosophy or meta-

physics of man must return to man his concreteness
and his
situaoionality. To Marcel, the disease and evil of
modern
times is this lack of concreteness, this reducing of
men.

The Spirit of Abstraction

language is abstraction.

stracting animal.
limits.

V/e

In fact man is an ab-

Abstraction represents the finitude, his

select out of the total reality what we want and
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need to select out.

We leave behind everything
else.

Our

language does the same:

each word is a reduction of
what is
real in its complexity, fluidity,
and differentiation. Perhaps a discussion of one of these
will help to understand
Marcel* s spirit of abstraction a bit
better.

Reality, it seems to me, consists
of things infinitely
different or to put it differently,
there is an infinite degree of differentiation. The leaves
in autumn, for instance,
traverse an infinite span of color
differentiation. Our
language, on the other hand, is usually
two-dimensional,

sometimes three.

For all those beautiful and infinite
shades

of color, we have a very limited amount
of words:

red, yel-

low, yellowish-red, bright red, dull red,
and so on.

language by its very nature reduces reality.

V/e

Hence

always have

to ignore or set aside much of reality partly
because our

equipment is limited, our senses in addition to our
language,
and partly because we choose not to see what is alien
to our

purposes.

Our words themselves are abstractions in another
sense.

The word daughter, for example, is a short-cut term,

selecting out from all that person's characteristics only
those similarities she shares in common with other girls,

namely a bend or relationship with parents.
acteristics are excluded.

It should be clear that all these

words I'm using, for example girls
same way*

All other char-

,

are abstractions in the
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Marcel believes that, on a larger
scale, the ultimate abstraction (reduction) is the
philosopher's:
Philosophical rationalism can be of* no help
in
resolving the many problems and dilemmas
of human
existence; all its attempts to this effect
must
of necessity fail, because it removes
all these
problems from the concreteness of reality.
Its
c
for "objective verification leads to
^Yj
?g
the
artificial dualisms of subject and object,
"appearances and things
themselves," the empirical
and tne thinking ego, individual thought
and
"thought in general." What is "thought in
eral but thought v/ithout a thinker, thoughtgenemptied of personality? It is thus impotent
in
regard to the concrete, individual human destiny. 72
1

.

m

Inis abstraction can be more clearly seen
when we

consider Marcel's two different kinds of "reflection,"
pri
mary and secondary.

Primary reflection is that of the scientist but not
limited to him.

It is thinking about externals,

vation and verification.

it is obser-

It is knowledge confined to the

sphere of "seeing" and "having," that is, a purely scientific
and technical knowledge.

Its center is not the existing

individual but "thought in general," the impersonal thinking
Oj.

"Das Man.

"

it is Marcel's conviction that every episte-

mology which rests on "thought in general" inevitably leads
to a "democratization of knowledge" which ultimately means

the self-destruction of knowledge.

Such an epistemology

tends to glorify the purely "technical man," the "man in the
street," the "common man."

Marcel v/rites:

7 2 Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt

,

pp. 207-20S.
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Philosophical and metaphysical knowledge is
essen—
°PP os ed to "das Man," The immortal glory of
a Kierkegaard or a Nietzsche consists in
having
demonstrated, not so much by rational arguments as
by their lives, that a philosopher worthy of
the
name is not, cannot be, and must not be a man of
the
public, oi meetings, and conventions; that he
debases himseli to the extent that he allows himself
to be deprived of that solitude which is his proper
vocation.
Secondary reilection, on the other hand, consists
in asking about the primary reflection!

ditions which make it possible?

what are the con-

and what are the limits of

the situation?

Reduced by the State
Marcel, for me more clearly than Jaspers, deals with

the dangers to the numan being of the reductionist tendencies
of modern society, tendencies which obscure the mystery of

life.

"There are sectors of human life in the present world

where the process of automatization applies not only, for instance, to certain definite techniques, but to what one would

have formerly called the inner life, a life which today, on

the contrary, is becoming as outer as possible. "7^

Somehow

that level of living and attention and what Marcel calls

"presence" which make for humanly intimate relationships has

been reduced.

Marcel claims that we are living in a world

in which the preposition "with" and the noun "togetherness"

pp.

73Marcel, Etre et Avoir , p. 145, quoted in Reinhardt,
213-214.

^Mystery of Being

,

pp. 30-31.

42

seem more and more to be losing their
meaning. He says:
It is, or so it seems to me, by starting from
the
fact of the growingly complex and unified social
organization of human life today, that one can see
most clearly what lies behind the loss, for indi^ih-U-3-lo
01 life s old intimate quality.
In what
does this growingly complex organization— this socialization of life, as we may call it really consist? Primarily, in the fact that each one of us
is being treated today more and more as an object,
whose behavior ought to contribute towards the
progress of a certain social whole, a something
rather distant, rather oppressjiye, let us even
frankly say rather tyrannical .
,

—

^

Marcel explains that the danger is that a person may confuse
(reduce) himself, his real personality, his mystery, with

the State* s official record of his activities and that we
ought to be really frightened of such an identification.

There is a book by C. Gheorgiu called The Twenty-fifth Hour

where a young man who has been falsely denounced to the
Germans by nis father— in— law is sent to a deportation camp
as being a Jew; he has, however, no means of proving that he
is not a Jew.

But he is labeled as such.

Later, in another

camp, he attracts the attention of a Nazi leader, who dis-

covers in him the pure Aryan type; he is taken out of the
camp and has to join the S.S.

Aryan.”

Now he is labeled as

’’Pure

He escapes with some French prisoners and joins the

Americans; he is first hailed as a friend but a few days later
he is put into prison:

Rumanian subject.

according to his passport, he is a

Rumanians are enemies, ergo

•

.

.

not the

least account is taken of what the young man himself thinks

7^ Ibid .

»

pp* 34-35«
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and feels.

At the end of the book, he has
managed to get

back to his wife.

But World War III arrives and husband,

wife, and child are all put into a -amp again
by the Americans, as belonging to a nation beyond the Iron
Curtain.

Appeals are made, a photograph is taken, and the
novel ends
with the words, "Keep Smiling."
Of this novel and others such as 1984

.

Marcel says,

The point, here, is not only to recognize that the
human, all too human, powers that make up my life
no longer sustain any practical distinction between
myself and the abstract individual all of whose
particulars" can be contained on the few sheets
of an official dossier, but that this strange reduction of a personality to an official identity
must have an inevitable repercussion on the way I
am forced to grasp myself; what is going to become
o^ this inner life, on which we have been concentrating so much of our attention?76

Even our solutions point to how completely we have accepted
a reduced idea oi ourselves as human beings.

We continue,

for example, in our belief in the possibility of benevolently

readjusting our human affairs, a belief that has persisted
throughout the 19th century among various schools of rationalists and into the 20th century among political and social
scientists.

We still, for example, hope that a system of

thought, if not Marxian, then some other abstraction, will
set things right.

Marcel notes, "there is nothing easier

than to imagine an analgesic technique for this purpose. "77

7^ Ibid .

,

p.

36.

77 ibid ., p. 43.
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Reduced by Technique

Technique is part of the reductive
degradation of
Marcel says:

man.

In our contemporary world it may
be said that the
an
comes dependent on the technioues
whose
^?
r
smooth functioning
assures him a tolerable life at
the material level, the more estranged
from an awareness of his inner reality. he becomes
I should
be tempted to say that the center
of gravity of such
a man and his balancing point tend
toMecome elterh
r ° jeCtS himself more and
more in^^objects!
!7l
.

f

How does this separation take place?

Perhaps because tech-

niques are procedures applied to problems
and problems are
things which I meet, which I find complete
before me and
which I there! ore can lay siege to and reduce.
But a human
being is a mystery and a mystery is something
in which I myself am in volved and it constitutes a sphere in
which the

distinction between what is in me and what is before
me loses
its meaning. Mystery transcends technique,
whereas technique
objectifies and reduces. Mystery invites participation.

Speaking in another sense of the separation which technical
progress brings about, Marcel says:

Between any sort of mechanical apparatus and its
possessor there cannot be established that living
that almost latently spiritual relationship, that*
exists,
or instance, between a small— holder and
hio piece of land: that exists there, because the
very notion of the cultivation of the ground implies, also, the notion of an extraordinary exchange— —a mutual, patient traffic between the land’s
fruitfulness and the peasant’s care. But is it not
j.

'

lianas

,

p.

55.
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rather the case that in the world where techniaue
is triumphant this idea of "exchange,” has
lost
’
its old values. . . .79
Ortega has said as much:

Technology for all its being a practically unTi^j-ted capacity will irretrievably empty the
lives of those who are resolved to stake everything on their faith in it and it along.
.
Just because of its promise of unlimited possibilities technology is an empty form like the most
formalistic logic and is unable to determine the
content o±. life.
That is why our time, being the
most intensely technical, is also the emptiest in
all human history.hU
.

.

Ts it a question of ordering the technology as so many be-

lieve today?

or ordering ourselves?

But ordering ourselves,

be it noted, is a philosophical task.

Marcel tasks always of the mystery at the heart of
being.

And that it is important for man if he would find

peace in the world and in himself, to touch this mystery.
But there are enemies which keep us from this sense of mystery:

all the forms of reduction including technique.

Marcel

would like to mark out a sphere of being to which techniques
are never able to gain access, a sphere of being he calls

the meta-technical (on the analogy of the metaphysical).

mentioned once to students in Great Britain:

Calculating machines rightly astonish us, and for
my own part I am quite incapable of saying to what
degree of perfection they may be brought. But what
we can certainly affirm is that it will never be
possible to construct a machine capable of interro 79 ibid *

;

^Ortega,

p.

5$.

Marias,

May 29, 1968,

p.

3*

He
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£atinr itself on the conditions that make it
possible
and on the limits of its own range of operations.
...
Marcel believes passionately that there is an intimate
link
between this reflection and the mystery of being, and
that
the more technique advances, the more such reflection
is
thrust into the background.

The progress and diffusion of

techniques tend to create a spiritual and intellectual atmosphere (or more precisely, an anti-spiritual and anti-

intellectual atmosphere) as unfavorable as possible to the
exercise of reflection.
At this point I could declare that the increasing

use of technique in education today, from teaching machines
to packaged learning kits to behavioral modification techniques, etc.:
of reflection.

all of which threaten to remove the possibility
But I will save this for another chapter.

But

what should be reflected on is that technique and method

(including educational methods) objectify people and make of

them functionaries.

They usurp spaces that people need both

to reflect and to share those reflections with each other.

They prevent mistakes and disappointment; they provide a kind
of security.

In an existential sense, to pursue security is

to diminish oneself!

Marcel asks whether we are planters and

harvesters accepting the possibilities of disappointment, as
the owner of a vineyard, for example, may see his loving care

destroyed by a hailstorm; or are we assembly line workers who
have precluded failure through acceptance of thorough control

hi

of all conditions surrounding us?

The choice Marcel’s meta-

phor is suggesting is that we gain from living
(or teaching
or learning) as much as we dare to risk of
our whole selves.
We can choose to "create ourselves" and "extend
our own

meanings" as stepping out into the unknown, or we
can ob.jec tif£ ourselves through accepting values, opinions,
custom
and becoming functionaries of the technique-ological
brave
new world.

Marcel believes that such a world soon ends up in a
situation where techniques become techniques of sin and for
sin

—techniques

at the service of sin.^3-

Quite generally, we can in fact say that the development of techniques does inevitably tend to give
a primacy, at the practical level, to the idea of
out. put .
Given these conditions, a being whose output has fallen below a certain level and become
practically nil will, from the point of view of a
world in which technique rules, a technocratic
world, be regarded as an unprofitable charge on
the society which still feels itself bound to care
for and maintain him. And the phrase "care and
maintenance," which is used of machinery, is very
revealing in this new context. Man is thought of
on the model of a machine. . . .82

Surely the many reductive manifestations in the world of education of this machine-model need not be repeated.

all-pervasive.

They are

And shocking given the degrading and reduc-

tive forces in the world today, a world flirting with masssuicide no doubt as a result of these very same degrading
^Manas, p. 95*
k^ lbid .

For a penetrating discussion of this model in
education, see Education and the Cult of Efficiency
.
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and reducing forces.

Shocking it is that intelligent
people
will not scream out more loudly
to proclaim that man must
have his whole-ness returned,
his inviolable and
irreducible
mystery again.

Mystery and Being
How may

v;e

approach mystery and being?

It should be

recognized that an approach and a
definition are possible to
a limited extent.
Marcel writes, "... I
suspect that the

characteristic of this need is that it
can never be wholly
clear to itself. 3 There is,
however, no more important
task, philosophically, than to attempt
to pierce through to
this ontological need. Without such
reflection, we end with
despair and betrayal. Speaking of the
connection between
hope and mystery, Marcel says:

m

Hope consists
asserting that there is at the heart
° f being, oeyond. all data, beyond
all inventories
and ail calculations, a mysterious principle
which
1
1
connivance with me, which cannot but will
^. ^
that
which I will, ii what 1 will deserves to be
willed
and is, in iact, willed by the whole of my
being. 34
It remains true nevertheless for Marcel
as for most

existentialists that hope and despair are inseparable.

While

the world we live in permits— and may even
as the modern world
does

absolute despair, yet it is only such a world that can

give rise to hope.

^ The

Marcel himself explicitly gives thanks to

Philosophy of Existentialism

%bid.,

p.

28.

,

p.

13.
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the great pessimists in the history of
thought.
gets us no closer to mystery and being.

But this

The difficulties

are due to the fact that mystery and
being are more than any
objects or ideals and since then, an
objective knowledge of

being is impossible, the knowledge which
can partially unveil the ontological mystery must be of a
different
kind.

Marcel says in dealing with the definition
problem:
As for defining the word "being,” let us
admit that
it is extremely difiicult.
I would merely suggest
this method ox approach: being is what
withstands
or what would withstand— an exhaustive analysis
bearing on the data of experience and aiming to
reduce them step by step to elements increasingly
devoid of intrinsic or significant value. 2 5
But such a method implied in the above is a "negative"
method

and Marcel implies strongly that the knowledge we are
after

will be a knowledge arrived at by exclusions rather than by
positive affirmations.

For example, in talking of the methods

of science, he reveals its limitations and in addition offers

an instance of knowledge arrived at by exclusions, "A phil-

osophy that stresses the activity of verification, ends by

ignoring presence through love which infinitely transcends
all possible verification, because it exists in an immediacy

beyond all conceivable mediation.

Mystery and Participation
In order to get closer to Marcel’s idea of "being,"

an explanation of his distinction between problem and mystery
£5 jbid ., p. 14.

S6 Ibid .

,

p.

15.
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may be of help.
For a man to recognize the presence of being
and
thereby to achieve authenticity, it is necessary
to approach
being as a mystery, not as a problem. Marcel
explains:

A problem is something which one hits upon,
something thcio blocks one's way. It is wholly in front
oi me.
A mystery, on the contrary, is something in
which I lind myself engaged, whose essence it is
consequently not to be wholly in front of me. It
seems that in this realm the distinction between
"within myself” and "in front of myself” loses all
significance. s 7

This distinction not only illuminates what Marcel means by

primary and secondary reflection but also the difference

between scientific and philosophical knowledge.

If I re-

flect on the presence (empirical reality) of an object or a
person, the simple being-there of either one, that is an

example of primary reflection.

What is important to note

immediately is that in such primary reflection, there has
already occurred the subject-object split.

If I reflect on

what conditions make it possible for me to "contact" that
object or person,

I

have to recognize some prior acts on my

part to "participate" in this object or person.

Without

this prior act of participation, the object does not exist;
without this "other," I do not exist.

Such secondary reflec-

tion is what allows us to deal with such phenomena as communication, presence, participation, etc.

It is there that it

is possible to re-unite object and subject.
^Vfiarcel, Being and Having
Existentialist Revolt , p. 214.

,

quoted in Reinhardt, The
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The same holds true for problem and
mystery and scientific investigation and philosophical
reflection. Problems
concern obstacles that are inventoried and
manipulated.
As

m

all scientific investigation, there is a clear
distinction between subject and object. The problem
"in front of"

the investigator is objectively, disinterestedly
approached
and a solution, objective, verifiable, and public
to all, is

produced.

The investigator is a depersonalised subject
in

his inquiry.

Marcel does not protest against this approach but
insists, as does Jaspers, that the objective approach as the

uuly method of studying reality must not be relied on as

fully us 2Gth century man does.

This approach does not do

full justice to human experience.
we can know of them.

Humans are more than what

Human experience includes mysteries

which are beyond the problematical and inaccessible to the
impersonal objectivity of science.

This realm of mystery

Marcel calls the "metaproblematical."
is not unknowable, Marcel says.

matic approach.

The metaproblematical

It is only from the proble-

"To posit the metaproblematical means to

think the primacy of being in its relation to knowledge
to recognize that knowledge is enveloped by being. "^9

.

.

.

The

natural urge to objectify mysteries and to reduce them to
82". . . and public to all" means a democratization of
knowledge which thrives on the objectification of human beings.

89Marcel, Positions and Approaches
The Existentialist Revolt p. 215.
,

,

quoted in Reinhardt,
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problems is an inauthentic tendency.
The distinctions made by Marcel are important
in

their consequences for education.

Authentic participation

through secondary reflection must inform educational
practices. But this entails passion and involvement

and confron-

tation.

Most of what goes on in schools, for example,
writing

and reading lack such participation.

A problematic approach

objectifies, separates and prevents a "living-in" that must
be encouraged in the name of authentic human-being.

I

will

also develop this later as support for imaginative literature
as an important means for teacher training.

Note here that to participate in mystery is a trans-

cending act.

This brings us back to Jaspers who maintained

that man is more than his empirical existence and it is only
by transcending to another mode of existence that man may

touch his fuller, more authentic humanity.
Marcel, here, would say that an authentic person

approaches being as a mystery in which he, as well as the
object facing him, are enveloped by the presence of being.

This will also lead us later, when I discuss teacher training,

to see the issue as not "how shall we teach?" but "how shall
we be?"

Briefly, most textbooks on teaching treat it as a

series of problems:

the problem of discipline, the problem

of teaching reading to ghetto children, the problem of motiva-

tion, the problem of evaluation, etc.

The distinctions Marcel

explores suggest strongly that there are crucial differences
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between looking at teaching-learning as
a problem and looking at it as a mystery.
hen a person treats life only as a series
of problems to be overcome, he is inauthentic.
To treat
being Lteachingj as a problem is to reject
the
appeal to authentically participate in beingit
is to close the self off from the
presence of being.
To approach it as mystery is to
begin to respond to the call of being to participate;
it is
to authentically respond to the ontological
need
and to open oneself to being's presence.90

l

Marcel writes of degrading the mystery to the status
of a
problem:
The ontological order can only be recognized personally by^ the totality of a being engaged in a
drama which is nis own, which at the same time it
surpasses him infinitely in every sense a being
to whom has been imparted the unioue power of affirming or negating himself depending on whether
hs affirms oeing and opens himseii to it or negates
being and thereby closes himself to it; in this dilemma resides the very essence of freedom. 91

—

—

^

Participation, ior Marcel, is transcending the sub ject— object
split, to be in relationship rather than to have a relationship.

Ihe world today, whether we're talking of education,

psychotherapy, religion, politics, family, or what, insists
on objectification, having , reducing man from his presence-

to— mystery •

In one of his plays, Le Monde Casse

.

Christiana

says:

—

Don't you feel sometimes that we are living if you
can call it living in a broken world? Yes, broken
like a broken watch. The mainspring has stopped

—

9°E. V/. Dillon, Development of an Engl i sh Ed. Course
from an Examination ol Six Existentialist Philosophers 19 6 S
,

9 ^Marcel,

Being-Having

,

p.

174.
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v/orking.

Jus^ to look at itj nothing has changed#
Everything is in place* But put it to your ear
and you don't hear it ticking.
The v;orld of
human creatures
•
had a heart at one time but
it stopped beating. 92
.

*

.

.

•

9 Parcel, The Mystery of Being

,

Vol. I, pp. 22-23.
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CHAPTER

IV

DIFFICULTIES IN CURRICULARIZING

EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY

Man is more than may be known conceptually
of him."
The existentialists dealt with here
are not

inter-

ested in sketching a picture of the
physical world, or in
outlining the nature of man, or in giving
us a new metaphysical theory. Rather their philosophizing
is designed
to reawaken us to our own authentic human
situation. And
for both Jaspers and Marcel this situation
is of such a sort
that any effort to freeze it conceptually or
dogmatically,
any attempt to schematize it exhaustively,
or turn it into
something known, must end in a falsification of
the situation
itself and in a destruction of our own authentic
possibili-

ties (mystery and Existenz)

.

The aim of their philosophizing

then is to call attention to the limits of knowledge
not with
the skeptical purpose of disposing of knowledge altogether,
but rather in order to let the truth which always lies
just

beyond those limits shine through for a moment.
But let us get closer to the educational problem.

Education in the 20th century seems to have a compulsive nature about it.

People seem to be investing in education all

of their hopes for a grander, clearer, less desperate future.

Leaving aside the question of whether schools can adequately

56

assume such a burden, it is clear
that education is today a
matter of great deliberate planning
and constant reform .
Everyone is considering how to improve
it or completely rethink its base. Everyone is busy
organizing education, planning, regulating, and enforcing.
Jaspers talks of these
activities but from the totalitarian point
of
view,

In the totalitarian world, education,
like everything else, is totally planned and
accordingly
regulated, and enforced in the smallest
detail.
There, tne cause is self-certain, clear,
and
equivocal. The totalitarians know how they unwant
to do things.
They organize education like machinery irom scientific-technological
points of
view, especially from psychological ones. 93
But these points of vi ew are operant in the
free

world also.

We have already seen how the premises of sci-

ence and psychoanalysis lead to the reductionism
of man’s

being.

./hen

we xorget the limitations of science and scien

tific planning, we can lose ourselves in the promises of
re
formers.

Jaspers said:

On the whole, the reduction of education to a processing of man into a useful, obediently functioning
tool of labor gives a strong impetus to participation in a power which promises to bring about a
magnificent future. It fills the masses with an
urge to plunge into the tide, to lose themselves
in functionalization, to become materiel, and to
make materiel of others. 94
If we in the free world do not want to destroy the

human spirit in the process of planning, then we must ask
9 ^Carl Jaspers,
9if

Ibid., p. 23.

Philosophy and the World

,

pp.

22-23.
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some hard questions:

what manner of educational
planning

would separate us from the totalitarian
processing? If not
useful and obedient functioning, then
what should give direction to our planning? Is there some "ground"
that gives
direction?

Are we informed by some sense of what
man is so
we can proceed to organize without violating
that sense?
If we don't have that sense, then the
temptations of scientific eificiency, expediency, and arrogance
will be too
strong for us. Planning and organizing in
education may be

necessary.

We need to protect ourselves, however, not from

planning but from a false spirit in this planning
and especially from a "planning that would comprehend the
incomprehensible . "95
Most existential tninkers and especially Jaspers and
Marcel, snow a distaste for system building.

Rational cate-

gories can be neatly and coherently ordered; existence defies

conceptualization.

The existential movement which Jaspers

and Marcel represent, really began as a reaction to absolute

schemes that purport to encompass and explain all existence.
It seems to me that it would be valuable then to

struggle with an education in the limits of knowledge

.

Such

an education would necessarily, it seems to me, be philosophi-

cal in method and religious in intent.

It would have the

distinctive asset, unlike modern education, of asking the
95 j.bid «

,

p.

24.

most important questions and hence being
religious in nature.
Since man himself, to the inter— subjective
existentialists, is always more than what he can know
himself to
be, then an education worthy of the name
human must never

imply that man is exhaustible by any conceptual
and scien-

tific knowledge.
"•

•

•

It would be an education of men who,

experience the maturity of that critical point where

everything turns upside down, where one understands more
and more that there is sometning which one cannot under—
stand. ”96
Hence, these existentialist thinkers have unfortu-

nately never formulated educational programs.

They have on

occasion commented briefly on this subject, as have
Kierkegaard, Buber, Tillich, etc., but they have never asked

themselves, at least in print, what might an educational

program be which is informed by existential insights?

I

believe the reason for this, and it will bring us to a com-

monality of Jaspers and Marcel as well as those mentioned
above, is a fear of erecting a conceptual framework of ab-

stract policies, procedures and arrangements which will dis-

tract people into meeting external goals and thereby losing
the existential locus.

The temptation to do so is strong as

Professor Fallico explains:
The existential attitude represents not so much
another philosophical position among many, as it

96jaspers, Reason-Existenz

,

pp. 25 - 26 .
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does, I think, the issue of any
philosophy which
comes to muturaty and to
self-consciousness. When
men first awaken to the need of
reflection, they
begin usually oy directing their sight
things farthest removed from themselves.on the
Onlv as
they return dis-heartened to the
starting-point
rich in the knowledge of non-purposive
objects but
sell -understanding, do they
sometimes come
k S
a e±y on their own human condition—
on
the fact thatf it is of their own
existence. 97

^

.

How then do

approach and utilize the insights of existential philosophers when to utilize means to
objectify
vie

a

philosophy which, at least for Marcel and Jaspers,
screams
against just that? Jaspers and Marcel both believe
that

discursive thought can never arrive at a universally
valid
concept of being but only at one view of Being among

others.

Jaspers said:
It matters, for this philosophy, who asks the question as to the nature 01 this Being: man's concrete
historical situation enters into the question and
into the answer.
In each individual, in all his
insecurity and disquiet, philosophy must make a new
start hence it is always in process and always in
suspension, it is never complete and final and can
never be set forth in the form of a universally and
eternally valid doctrine. 98
$

For Jaspers, at the level of Existenz, there is no

universal validity.
is futile.

The conceptual attempt at clarification

He repeatedly speaks, as do all existentialists,

of a basic in man which lies beyond all that the social sci-

ences and physical sciences can discover, viz., what is

called the soul, ego, psyche, or innermost self.

He says,

^Arturo Fallico, "Existentialism and Education," Edu cational Theory

.

IV (April, 1954), p. 166.

^°VET (Jaspers), p. 90.
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./hat in mythical terminology
are called
and God, and in philosophical language the soul
Existenz
and transcendence,
.do not have the same mode
being as the things in the world .
but they
can have some other.
Although they a r P n nf kno *J
t h eyr are not nothing
and our failure to come to X
V
them d ° eS n0t “P 1 * that
arfnot |hfSghf oi'!99
.

.

.

.

.

'

,

Martin Buber deepens our sense of the
limits of
intellection when he strongly insists on the
betrayal of
religiousness by conceptual means. What is
singular about
his point is his repeated insistence that
in unreserved
attentiveness to another person, we meet God:

"In each 'you'

we meet the eternal -You. -100

Buber x don

,

t

think means

here that when we address man, we address God
at the same
time but rather that when a person gives himself
completely
to the service of others, or when a man loves a
woman so

much that both forget themselves entirely and feel only
what
is "between" them (Buber's preposition) they live if
only

momentarily, in some space between them.

Buber's encounters

of man with man involves a discovery of something new,
i.e.,

the between, which in addition to being new, is not compre-

hensible in terms of previous experience.
yields theological insights.
ally but experienced.

To Buber, all this

God is not "known" intellectu-

The source of God is existential.

God

is "grounded" much closer to us and discovered in the intimacy

of personal encounters.

It is not intellect or searching or

9^Karl Jaspers, Philosophie

^9Martin Buber,

I

and Thou

,

,

Vol. II, p. 1.
p.

101.
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escaping but simple existential presence.
It seems to me, that if the mystery and
irreduci-

bility of human existence is not to be violated,
then it is
necessary, as when we would know God, that we
speak
and

listen to each other.

The rich treasures of personality

cannot be "grasped" as we grasp the objects of
science;

human richness in and out of the classroom must be
created

through invitation and word

.

Access to mystery and being seems to involve a turn—
ing from the direct method of teaching something to someone.
Direct communication is objective, focusing on the impersonal
"what."

Like Marcel's "problem" the "what" exists out there

and we confront it as something separate, challenging, to be

manipulated and conquered.

But if the essential concern is

the student's passionate relationship to his knowledge and
the commitment fostered, then personal appropriation and

"living-in" become the goal.
The use of literature, it seems to me, offers a way
out of the "betrayal of our mystery."

the arts, speaks to the whole man.

Literature, as do all

It thrusts upon the

reader, if he would make himself accessible, an immediacy;
out of the artist's "presence" to his world, a "between" is
t

created that we may enter into.
is inexpressible conceptually.

Literature expresses what
It refuses to "name" a thing,

as if to name it would kill its chances of entering the

imagination.

Shakespeare seems to suggest the same danger
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when in one of his plays he talks of an
Elizabethan game
called "bowls.” The object of the game is to
pitch a ball
in such a way that it comes close to the lead
ball but
doesn't touch it.

Literature engages the whole man on an

imaginative non— conceptual level, taking the long
way
around, dislocating the language into a poem or
story.
not go straight to the point?

Is not the shortest distance

between two points a straight line?
lead bowl?

Why

Why not simply hit the

Perhaps access to human mystery is not linear

and as E. E. Cummings has said, "A world of made is not a

world of born.

I'rost

also suggests the notion of access

when he claimed that the right reader of the right poem
receives an immortal wound
That is to say

,

j.

rom which he will never recover

that a work of art is more liable to pene-

trate to the existential, concrete, immediate "I" than the

rational exchange so characteristic of modern education.
Dewey has said:
It is by way of communication that art becomes the
incomparable organ of instruction, but the way is
so remote from that usually associated with the
idea of education, it is a way that lifts art so
far above what we are accustomed to think of as
instruction that we are repelled by any suggestion
of teaching and learning in connection with art.
our revolt is in fact a reflection upon education
that proceeds by methods so literal as to exclude
the imagination and one not touching the desires
and emotions of man. 161
.

161 John Dewey, Art as Experience

,

p.

347*

.

.
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The question always for education
is:
do justice to the part (whole?)

how may we

of human existence left over

after rationality and conceptualization
have had their day?

64

CHAPTER

V

DIALOGICAL TEACHING:

ALL REAL

TEACHING IS MEETING
It is a ls° possible for a leader in business
to

business with dialogue by meeting the men
with whom he works as persons. Even when°he
cannot
meet them directly, he can be "inwardly aware
with
a latent and disciplined fantasy, of the
multitude
of persons," so that when one of them does step
before him as an individual, he can meet him "not as
a number with a human mask but as a person. "102

Recently

I

ooserved an English class in operation

and while sitting in the rear

entitled:

I

noticed a sign on the wall

Twelve Reasons for Shakespeare's Greatness.

And

somehow in an immediate flash of understanding, it came to
me that this is what is wrong with our educating, namely,
our*

insistence on oojecuifying that which is un— object ifyable.

Shakespeare's greatness can only be

a

matter of conscious-

ness, of "presence," of participation and these like being

itself cannot be shown and cannot be indicated.

This is what

Marcel means when he says that being can only be alluded to,
a little as some third person now disappeared is alluded to

amongst friends who knew him formerly and keep his memory
green.

And even this comparison is useful only if the memory

of the person who has disappeared is not converted into an

object about which we are "discursive and ratiocinative.
10 Maurice Friedman, The Life of Dialogue

,

p.

SB.

The
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being in question, who has become
active subject, must magnetise a certain silence charged
with memory and affectivity. ”103
No doubt the teacher, in creating
such a sign as
described above, was attempting, in
good faith, to make the
notion of Shakespeare's greatness more
real.
It did not
occur to her as it does not to the
whole educational establishment that consciousness and being
are slippery, espe-

cially when thought is used as access
to them.
being, like the aim of "participation,"

The aim of

is to pass beyond

the point of opposition between me and
what confronts me.
This is again to restate the problem of
being and having
developed earlier.
The question for the teacher must be how
to invite

pupils to be present to the subject matter so
that it ceases
to be objectified as subject matter. But
this can only come
about on the condition that the teacher is
present to the

material which means a connection to it, a
living-in-thematerial. One of the ways to understand this is

perhaps to

say that the teacher and his students must work up
the kind
of sweat that the author felt in his writing.

they reading:

Else, what are

surely not the same words he wrote!

And it is

when the pupils "live-in" the same spaces as the writer
that
the barrier between present and past is transcended.
10 - Gabriel

Marcel, Metaphysical Journal

,

p.

VIII.

The

66

pupils then ’’participate" in all men’s longings
and struggles
to create themselves and extend themselves.
If this
is so,

then this "participation" also transcends the present
in the
direction of the future.
This kind of teaching through presence then, binds
up present, past and future and it is through this
presence
that the pupil participates in his own freedom to create.

Buber v.ould say here tnat the pupil learns "to know con—
cretely the becoming of the human creature.

.

.

.”104

But it must be understood that access to this pres-

ence cannot be had except through passion.

What this means

is that the teacher must authentically feel the existential

questions himself, to have remained existentially alive.
The existential teacher continuously asks such questions as:

What does it mean to be educated?

What is my vocation?

conditions make it possible for love to be?

tives?

What

What are my mo-

What are my responsibilities to myself, to society,

to the subject which I teach, and to my students?

education affect my life?

How does

What is my view of death?

created docile disciples or independent thinkers?

Have I

Have

I

created isolated thinkers along with independent thinkers?
The inauthentic teacher can hide behind knowledge as one more

"arrangement" along with the curriculum, the schedule, and
academic respectability.

10A-I4.

Buber says of the existential

Buber, Philosophical Interrogations

,

p.

68.
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teacher that:
*
to rescue one's real personal self from the fiery
jaws of the collectivism which devours all
self-hood
The longing to do this is hidden in thn nain
q+^

-t-

Vi

the longing as well. To keep this pain alive
and°to'
awaken tne longing this is the first task of everyone who regrets the obscuring of eternity. This
is
also the primary task of the genuine educator in
our
tune 10
time

—

.

-5

This presence to pain and longing is not a problem

objectified and out there to be solved.

—6-Q.

-i-

n f\ h um an.

It is the condition

either we attack it, politicize it, manipu-

late it; or we open ourselves to its humanizing force.
To know how far we are from this- presence

,

we only

need to note our predilection for political solutions to
what we conceive of al political problems.

thing to keep hold of consciousness

;

in fact, as soon as we

consider it as something to keep hold of
come objectified and politicalized.

It is a slippery

.

it has already be-

Although we do need

sometimes to take hold of our world, to impose order and
exercise control, there is another mode of being-in-t he -world,
one which

vie

could say serves as the source of that other

more politicalised mode.

This other mode takes place in a

matrix of imagery, art, poetry, and metaphor.

While the

first mode is essentially logical, scientific and seeks to

Buber. Between Man and Man (Boston:
19.56), p. 110.

Beacon Press,
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create order, the second stirs the imagination.

Every man

should be aware of his concrete world and its
problems, of
himself as a man of a certain century with its
particular
problems.

But to know about and to solve these problems
is

not the same as to know about the limitations of
existence:

to know about home and homelessness.

bluntly and in the form of a question:

To state the issue
to what extent can

political solutions solve or even touch existential matters?

How much of the existential pain and uncertainty can be
remedied by political action?

A socio-political situation

is capable of being changed by political action and by vari-

ous endeavors which are related to political action.

The

existential situation, insoiar as it is truly existential,
has its remedy (to the extent that it needs or can have a
remedy) in non-political forms of behavior.

These forms of

behavior are the quest for self-knowledge, the working toward

maturity

—a

reconciliation with the existential facts of life.

Man is more than the political exhortations of teachers and
politicians.

This is the message of Antigone.

It is behind

the scene in very nearly all of James Baldwins writing on
the predicament of the Black in the United States.

He points

out that the naive political remedy for Blacks' problems

might give them "everything” that tne white man has

— but

is

this, after all, what the dignity of man, black or white,

requires?

The white man's life is by no means the norm of

human dignity, and to define the Blacks’ ends in these terms
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is to collaborate in his betrayal.

The problem, then, and

all great teachers speak to this problem, is:

how do we

distinguish between what we must dc for ourselves,
as human
beings, and what can we do politically, as the
makers of

socio-economic systems?
But obviously oefore an answer can come to this

question, men must be more sensitive and aware of these
two

modes of being, especially the existential since that
is so
severely slighted in the modern age.
also.

And schools slight it

Surrounded for six hours by "arrangements" which are

by nature social and political, no wonder there is no con-

tact with their human— ness.

Even humanities courses, tra-

ditionally the time of "connecting" with man's hopes, dreams,
joys, disquietude, have given themselves over to analysis

and objective knowledge, and people wonder at the desecra-

tion of property, the furious anger and desperation of school
children.

Most learning, including courses in humanities, turn
out to be variations of "Twelve Reasons for Shakespeare's

Greatness."

At the level of Existenz, there is no universal

validity as in "Twelve Reasons for Shakespeare’s Greatness."
The conceptual attempt at clarification is futile.

While the truth may ultimately be one, the oneness
cannot appear to us directly. The truth of Existenz
lies more in the act than in the content. Existential thought is either true, and then it is indissolubly connected with the being of the thinker; or
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t0
it is false! 1§£

^

kn0WCl like any other
>

and then

Instances abound in educational situations of
people
asking the wrong questions, in this case,
un-existential
questions.

And, of course, it is a truism, that
the answers

people get depend on the questions they ask.

Ever since men

ha/e thought about education, a conflict has
existed which
can be expressed, although over-simplified, by the
questions

shall we teach children? or shall we teach subject
matter?
It seems to me that this way of phrasing the
cues—

inevitably leads to polar positions which confuse

rather than clarify.

And the polar confusions translate

inevitably into the terms:

liberal/conservative or

progressivist/ essentialist , etc.

Often when conflicts re-

main intense over a long period of time, that is a sign that
both sides possess some truth and perhaps it is time to go

beyond the traditional way of phrasing the questions.
At first glance, the existentialists would seem to

align themselves with the progressivist s.

Isn’t man’s

unique experience the subject matter rather than someone
else’s experience written down in books?

until we ask:
experience?

It would seem so

why cannot the encounter with knowledge be an
Mot as some abstract body of accumulated knowl-

edge but as something into which

something to which
106 VET, p. 90.

I

I

enter and participate,

become "present," where, as Marcel
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suggests, the distinction between what is in me and
what is
in front of me disappears. But note that when we
ask the

question in this form, we no longer objectify either stud.ent

or knowledge as something apart from one another.

Learning, in what

I

am going to call the dialogical sense of

the word, is fusion and not fission, a walking into
spaces
that can be created by a dialogical teacher.

Immediately the question ceases to be:
we teach, subject or child? and becomes:

which shall

is the teacher

present to the subject matter? how to invite the pupil’s

presence?

The authoritarian teacher who sees himself as the

holder of knowledge and the students as receptacles for the
knowledge ignores the student and what he brings to the

learning situation.

But the progressivist teacher who sees

himself as the clearer-of-the-path so that the latent creative powers within the student will spontaneously erupt ig-

nores the disciplines necessary to learning.

But more to

the point about these two ways of rationalizing the problem
is that both ignore the significance and power of the rela-

tionship between teacher and student upon which so much depends.

There is no conflict between the intellectual

discipline- and the student -teacher realtionship

belong together.

;

the two

That which is taught comes from man's

relation with himself, others, and the world in which they
live.

Learning, then, should not be abstracted from that
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relating, that being- in-the-world.

This suggests that knowl-

edge is personal knowledge or it reduces and
degrades human
beings oy offering itself as reproducible and
verifiable to
beings who are replaceable, so to speak. This
democratiza-

tion of human beings occurs daily in schools on every
level.
Knowledge, that which is taught, comes from man*s

relation with himself
live.

logue

,

others, and the world in which they

Knowledge, then, is not the pre-condition for dia,

it is the end result.

the world.

e

know oecause we encounter

In history teaching, for example, there is an

erroneous assumption that historical meaning is inherent in
the past.

10 put it another way, historical consciousness,

the awareness that we emerge from a history, is a temptation

to understand the present exclusively from the past.

We

forget very easily that the past can offer explanations only

after and to the extent that it itself has become understandable through the present

.

Knowledge and meaning, then, are

always the result of dialogue and encounter.

The dialogical

teacher could not be satisfied with the transmission of
"knowledge,” content, subject matter.

These are not the end

result but the raw material for human meanings which emerge
out of human presence and participation.
be literally created anew.

The end result must

There ±s no other way to think

of learning without reducing man to the level of thing.
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Communication is Not Dialogue
It is somewhat interesting to
note that even for

those educators who profess critical
thinking and discussion
as high-priority goals, little
philosophical justification
is offered beyond what appears to
meet the needs of a democratic citizenry. The context and
thrust of existential
thought, on the other hand, with its
insistence
on the end-

less ambiguity of all existence and action,
suggests that
insofar as we are honest we live in a "sea
of reflection
where no one can call to another, where all
buoys are dialectical." 10 ? But this reflection is,
precisely through its
endlessly active dialectic, the condition of
freedom.
Infinite reflection is possibility; it is the form
in which I

permit myself to know about what

I

am not yet, and a prepara-

tion for it.
Existence is a question, and existential teaching

would seek to return the pupil to the larger questions,
the
sense of the predicament, the life-giving tensions which

transform the pupil and make him more lucid about himself as
a human being.

A dialogical education, then, would be quite differ-

from current school practices which center around communication.

Huebner states that, "Communication implies only

the transfer of information from one to another, whereas

dialogue suggests that the recipient act on this information,
10|/ Karl

Jaspers, Reason and Existenz , p. 32.
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reshape it or himself and continue the dialogue
at a new
level*
Dialogue demands the acceptance and acknowledgment of the reality and value of the other person.

Figure

1

depicts individuals in the act of communication:

Figure

2

depicts individuals in dialogue:

C D
U

What is diificult to depict is that in figure

2,

extended

meanings are created^ there exists a condition of "openness
to experience*"

In dialogue each individual comes to oper-

ate as a "first behaver."

In this condition, for example,

the teacher would not demand behavior from others:

he is,

with the students, a beginner, a "first behaver," inquiring
into meanings.

This suggests that he searches his own think-

ing with meanings rather than isolate himself as the "settled
one" with knowledge.

In the approach to dialogue the indi-

vidual moves out of the "role" behavior which captivates him
in connection with routinized and institutionalized tasks.

When a teacher communicates in the systematized role, he does
so in terms of the language of the ueacher.

When he is in

Dwayne Huebner, "New Modes of Man's Relationship to
in
Man,"
New Insi gh ts an d the Curriculum Yearbook Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (Wash., D. C.,
1963), p. 146.
,
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dialogue he finds himself within the language
of himself as
a person.
Likewise, the talk which proceeds in
connection
with subject matter is in terms of that content.
What we
are after here is a "presence” to one's existence,
a "presence" attainable or approachable only through
dialogue where
people trust their minds enough to "live in" the
meanings
and hence extend their own meanings.

Knowledge is not "out there" readymade and waiting
to be appropriated.

It is that which results from and not

predates encounter.

Likewise meaning needs to be created by

an individual who behaves (as in figure

with meaning.

2)

as a first one

This does not mean that subject matter has no

place in learning:

areas of knowledge are the product of

living and thinking men, and it is "presence" to their lives
and their attempts at extended meanings which must be entered
into.

Again the question is not "what to teach" but "how to

be present to the world and knowledge."

duces both the goal and the knowledge.

Any other goal reOn the other hand,

such a presence to knowledge as is being suggested here is

itself an example of authentic dialogue.
In presenting a poem, for example, the dialogical

teacher would simply present it

— not

to teach or instruct

but only because the poem expresses a significant dimension

of the teacher's world.

The teacher fuses with something

that compels, invites, activates, and challenges himself to

new awareness and meanings.

In Buber's terms, a "between" is
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created, something additional to the person
and the material.
This non-objectifying participation is the
invitation for
students to enter:
existential spaces are created into

which humans enter with their whole selves risking
meaning
Without this dialogical encounter, there would

.

be

no present; the poem's reality would exist only in
the past
as it fit into a teacher's categories of knowledge.

Either

the teacher "meets" with the poem in "presence" or the
poem

withholds its truth.

The same is true for persons:

either

the teacher becomes fully present to the pupil or the pupil

withholds his reality

•

A teacher does not gain access to a

student through his perceptions which are incomplete or the

categories into which tne student iits since those categories

inevitably reduce the reality.

—to

Knowledge is through presence

spirit and not only to matter.

In talking of the "truth"

of God, Buber almost indicates that without "meeting" and the

creation of the "between," there is no truth;
Any genuine human life-relationship to Divine
Being i.e. any such relationship effected with
a man's whole being is a human truth, and man
has no other truth. The ultimate truth is one,
but it is given to man only as it enters, reflected as in a prism, into the true liferelationships of the human person. 109

—

—

Likewise the truth of the student's being is a human
truth, not as an objective thing tc be used, classified, or

trained but gathered into presence

,

gathered into a teacher's

l^piartin Buber, quoted in Maurice Friedman, The Life of
Dialogue (New York, 1955), p. l6l.
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being-in-the-world.

The achievement of this relation re-

sults in "Trust, trust in the world because this
human
being exists ."110

—

Once long ago there were no teachers and no schools.

Young people apprenticed themselves to coppersmiths, philosophers, religious men and, through the apprenticeship,
learned, in addition to the skills, "and without noticing

that they did, che mystery of personal life:

the spirit." 111

they received

The problem with which I've tried to deal

here in this paper is precisely:

how to bring about the

"receiving of the spirit" and how to do this in a modern
educational enterprise which has forgotten such words and
such a presence as spirit.

Always, the best of teaching has

been a teacher who can discover and nourish in the soul of
the student what that teacher has recognized in himself as
the right.

And because it is the right, it must also be

living in the student as a possibility, unlocked not through

instruction but existential meeting.
The central idea of this existential meeting is a

difficult one to keep hold of:

as both Marcel and Jaspers

point out, the world instructs mightily in objectifying

things and persons.

Dialogical education is difficult also

in that it approaches quickly the area of love, community,

and religion.

As such it is, to say the least, not easily

11 ^Martin Buber, Between Man and Man
11 1

Ibid .

,

p.

90.

,

p. 94.

translated into pedagogical terminology; in fact, what
is
needed is an existential vocabulary for the educational
situation.
That educators miss the truth of dialogue can be

seen in the now shaky hopes invested in the free school

movement.

Thinking that the opposite of authoritarian

teaching is ireedom, the free school people abandoned the
notion of "teacher" and hence abandoned the youngsters.

As

Buber points out:

... at the opposite pole from compulsion there
stands not freedom but communion. Compulsion is
a negative reality; communion is the positive
reality; freedom is a possibility, possibility
regained.
At the opposite pole of being compelled
by destiny or nature or men there does not stand
being free of destiny or nature or men but to commune and to covenant with them. To do this it is
true that one must first have become independent;
but this independence is a foot-bridge, not a
dwelling place. 112
Hence, teaching is "meeting."

But this idea, as

most of the ideas in this paper, is artistic rather than

scientific.
a formula.

As such, it defeats the effort to put it into

Rather it has to be felt and grasped by the wise

teacher, who, either from the gift of happy intuition or

through patient reflection on his own successes and failures
has come to understand the dialogical relation.

Pernaps what is being asked for is saintliness.

Per

haps we have become so preoccupied with the science of educa
tion, the Dasein-analysis (Jaspers) and the problematical

ll^Martin Buber,

I

and Tho u, p. 91-
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(Marcel)

,

that we have neglected to take note of the
artistry

it exacts in practice.

Finally, Buber again:
In an age which is losing form ... the ones who
count are those persons who though they may be
of little renown respond to and are responsible
for the continuance of the living spirit", each in
the active stillness of his sphere of work.H3

—

113 Ibid .

,

p.

131.

—
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CHAPTER
WHAT DEATH MAY YIELD:

VI
TOWARD AN

EXISTENTIAL CURRICULUM
Since existentialism focuses on the notions which

indicate a man's personal relationship with the world, notions such as death, love, hate, anxiety, fear, etc., these

notions are not only appropriate for school curriculum but

necessary if schools mean to touch deeper levels within its
student -humans.

The purpose of the following pages is to

deal with death as a sample existential issue, to explore

what the acknowledgment of death can yield in human terms,

and to explore the issue of death as school curriculum as a

possibility of extending human existence.
In Ernest Hemingway's story, "A Day's Wait," nine-

year-old Schatz thinks he is going to die of influenza because
he has a temperature of 102 degrees, and he has heard that

44 degrees means certain death.

During the few hours' dura-

tion of the story, he is in full control of himself, solicitous of his father's well-being, even in the face of his own

impending death, and generally acts not like the typical nine-

year-old boy.

At the end when his father discovers Schatz'

confusion over Centigrade and Fahrenheit, he explains that
Schatz is not about to die.

Whereupon Schatz 's hold over

himself relaxed and he cried easily at "little things that
were of no importance."

Death, says Kierkegaard, is "the test of earnest-

ness. ”11^

Earnestness is sincerity, or, in the Latin, sine

ceras, "the absence of wax"

— it

is the purity of existence.

Death tests this purity, as it did in the case of Schatz.
Schat-z was purified,

put away all unimportant things,

and perhaps in facing death was closer to the "pain-sharing
of all men" and hence could feel care and concern for his

father as well as others in the house.
One of Karl Jaspers' most important theories, it was
seen, is that of the limit-situation in which we must either

develop into something larger and finer or lose our souls.

Surely the foremost limit-situation is death where, as Sartre

freedom is revealed to man.

puts it:

Life is reduced to

its simplist terms and the way is cleared for the future.

Rollo May has elaborated on what the acknowledgment
of non-being can yield:

To grasp what it means to exist, one needs to grasp
the°fact that he might not exist that he treads at
every moment on the sharp edge of possible annihilation and can never escape the fact that death will
arrive at some unknown moment in the future. Existence, never automatic, not only can be sloughed off
and forfeited but is indeed at every instant ^threatened by non-being. Without this awareness of nonbeing that is, awareness of the threats to one's
living in death, anxiety, and the less dramatic but
persistent threats of loss oi potentialities in
conformism existence is vapid, ^unreal, and cnaracterized by lack of concrete se±f~awareness. But
with the confronting of non-being, existence takes
on vitality and immediacy, and the individual

—

—

114 S . Kierkegaard, Thoughts on Crucial Situation ^ —in
nugsbur^,
Human Life, trans. by David Bwenson (Minneapolis:
I9"4l7

1
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experiences a heightened consciousness of himself
his world, and others around him. 115
Certainly, it may be said of Hemingway's story, that Schatz
came to a different level of self-consciousness and, moreover, a heightened consciousness of all the people in the

house.

Almost all existentialists hold that the confronting
of death gives the most positive reality to life itself.

It

makes the individual's existence real and concrete, makes

him realize the potentiality of being and non-being in others

when he realizes the inescapable nature of his own death.
But we need not go as far as the extreme example of

death to see the problem of non-being.

Rollo May again:

Perhaps the most ubiquitous and ever-present form
of the failure to confront non-being in cur day is
in conformism, the tendency of the individual to
let himself be absorbed in the sea of collective
responses and attitudes, to become swallowed up in
das Man with the corresponding loss of his own
awareness, potentialities, and whatever characterizes him as a unique and original being.
,

Hence, death and the encounter with death, and the

acknowledgment of death are intimately tied up with the problem of living.

The question is:

why isn't this area ex-

plored and articulated more often and why doesn't education
deal with the potentiality of death as an existential no-

tion?

It is not hard to find reasons, for in our society at

large there is a widespread repression of death.
115 Ro i1o May, Existence

H^Rollo May,

p.

49.

,

pp. 46, 49.

This repression

of*

death is pervasive in America,

perhaps in all modern ,/estern civilizations#
this topic as
on doubt and

Even suggest—

curriculum*’ lor public education brings

reticence.^

Death ls for us obscene and

unmentionable, not to be looked at if one can help it.

We

have big funeral services which seem to demonstrate that,

after all, the person did not die.

We buy "life insurance"

which doesn’t insure our lives but others’ economic wellbeing in the event of our death .

Geoffrey Gorer thinks that

in this denial of death lies the root of the violence and

sadism that comes out in American comics and television programs.

He says:

Nevertheless, people have to come to terms with the
basic facts of birth, copulation, and death, and
somehow accept their implications; if social prudery prevents this being done in an open and dignified fashion, then it will be done surreptitiously.
If we dislike the modern pornography of death, then
we must give back to death natural death its parade and publicity, re-admit grief and mourning.
If we make death unmentionable in polite society
"not in front of the children" we almost insure
continuation of the "horror comic." No censorship
has ever been really effective.^i^

—

—

—

The Jesuit writer Father William Lynch notes the effect of
the Christian misuse of hope playing into the American illu-

sion that we can somehow escape death:

studies of death and death symbolism in Hiroshima
by Robert Jay Lipton.

Tl^Geoffrey Gorer, "The Pornography of Death," in The
B erkley Book of Modern Writin g, #3, ed. bv William Phillips
Berk publishing Company, 1956), p. 62.
’(New York:
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follows lor the imagination if it does not
the elementary gift of dealing directly with the have
image and f act, ox death? It will then' deal with
it
indirectly that is to say, in bizarre ways* , , ,
Its usual formula is violence. The violent and sadistic imagination, thereiore, rather than indicating
strength and masculinity, signifies the evasion of a
fact.
The imagination must be a coping, not an evading instrument . 1 19

\<hat

,

Indeed, not only should imagination oe a coping instrument,

but so should the curriculum in a school cope, not evade,

existential issues of life, death, love, suffering, etc.
Is it possible that the violence and belligerence of Americans, what is sometimes referred to as an irreverence for

life, is related to our repression of death.

Our murderous

behavior in Vietnam, the slaying of un-armed Kent State University students, the unfeeling massacre of prison guards
and inmates at Attica:

do we actually court death out of a

need to touch its reality, a reality which is not only vigorously denied in itself in our culture but denied in its re-

lated expressions such as grief and mourning.

How much of

our murderous behavior reflects a need to reclaim to our-

selves an act which is basic, ultimate, ubiquitous, and

charged with implications for our living?

And denied.

But the issue must be pursued to another level yet.

Death is a personal phenomenon, the most "personal" thing in
the ultimate sense.

This very personal nature of the experi-

ence is that which is repressed in our need to make death

Il%iiiiam Lynch, Images of Hope (Baltimore:
Press, 1965), p. 245.

Helicon

impersonal.

We refer to statistics and thereby obscure

death, we state that "one" dies, rather than
that "I" die.

But to diminish awareness of such a personally
ultimate

experience is to diminish the experience of being alive.
The critical issue in the facing of death lies in this
area
of the human being* s heightened self-consciousness.

ened consciousness of what?

Height-

Blaise Pascal says:

Man is only a reed, the feeblest thing in nature;
but he is a thinking reed. There is no need for
the entire universe to arm itself in order to
annihilate him:
a vapor, a drop of water, suffices to kill him. But were the universe to crush
him, man would yet be more noble than that which
slays him, because he knows that he dies, and the
advantage that the universe has over him; of this
the universe knows nothing. Thus all our dignity
lies in thought. 1 ^ 0
Again, the awareness of death sharpens our sense of

being.

The capacity to face death is the means by which we

gain freedom.

In this awareness, existence becomes some-

thing that is not automatic:

experience takes on vitality

and immediacy; I experience a heightened consciousness of

myself and of the world around me.
Death, as one of my students suggested, is the great

equalizer.

Rollo May says:

The awareness of death is also the ultimate source
of human humility.
The fact that we all at some
time die puts every man in the same boat with every
other human being, free or enslaved, male or female,
child or adult. Thus the facing of death is the

-*-20ro11o May, Restless Adventure
Scribner*s, 196 Sj
p. 20?.

,

ed. by Shinn (New York
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strongest motive and requirement that we be fellow
—=
men. . . .1^1

—

This is what Theseus

the hero in Sophocles* Oedipus in

,

£olqnus, is saying:

"I know I am only a man, and I have no

more to hope for in the end than you have."

Death is the

humanizing fact which makes us fellow men. 122
V/hat

both existential thinkers assert is that the

journey to authentic existence requires a personal, subjective confrontation with the ever-present possibility of one’s
own death.
tion.

For Kierkegaard, it is a principle of individua-

The individual must think ethically or subjectively

about it

his death, not man’s in general.

If the individual

thinks of death so as to make a reality of it, his decisiveness grows. 12 3

To face death existentially helps the person

to become subjective, authentic, decisive.

For Jaspers, death is one of the six boundary situations.

Facing death leads the individual to consider his

possible fulfillment in life. 12i+

Here again, death individu-

ates and frees the individual for choosing and creating himself.

Facing in dread the limit situation of death enables

l^Rollo May, Restless Adventure

,

p.

208.

T 22 Human fellowship is also the goal of sensitivity
training. But I perceive an important difference in that
aims for fellowship through what is
sensitivity training
possi ble, existential encounter aims through what is not
possibl e". The difference is not a negligible one.

T23Kierkegaard, Postscript

,

pp. 148-151*

Vol. II, cited in Reinhardt,
p hilosoohie
.
Revolt
197*
The Existentialist
p
124-Karl j asperSj

,

,

,

37

the person to separate the trivial from the
significant and
thus challenge the person to live more fully,
and to choose
more resolutely.

Marcel considers death a test of man*s creative
fidelity. It can av;aken man from inauthentic

decisionless

life and force him to choose to accept the call to
partici-

pate authentically by being open to other "thous."
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CHAPTER

VII

IMAGINATIVE LITERATURE AS METHOD
We want schooling to be humanly effective but the

schools have no resonance.

We do not really need to read

Silberman* s cook, Crisis in the Classroom

schools are full of pettiness and trivia.
ent in teacher training programs:

,

to know that the
It is no differ-

here where it is so neces-

sary to touch our deepest selves so that we would know and

feel the real nature and challenge of our jobs as teachers,
we come face to face again with trivia.
Is it too much to ask, for example, that in between

the third graders* activities with coloring books, they are

read a story which reveals ambiguity and paradox?

Is it too

much to ask the high school science teacher to take the time
in class to read one of Joseph Wood Krutch*s essays which

always vibrate with something human which exists beyond science?

Is it too much to ask that public schools deal with

the "holy" and the "sacred" and the "religious" in man, not
as dogma but as areas of being which resonate with mystery?

This past year

I

experimented with methods of teach-

ing a course in just such directions.

Reading educational

philosophy failed because it consisted of philosophical abstractions.

Sensitivity sessions had failed because the

whole rationale lacks resonance, and in addition,

I

found it

S9

dixficulu to avoid objectifying people by surrounding
them
with expectations.
Herce, I planned a course abound existentially
edu-

cational literature.

The purpose in dealing with literature

was to avoid "talking about" ideas and, instead, to
"appro-

priate and involve" ourselves.

ential irm..cdiacy on the reader

Literature forces an experij

obviously that is why so

many existential philosophers preferred the art form.

Since

a good work of art cannot be translated into other terms,

it

becomes then a model for existential man who, since he too
cannot be translated, must contain mystery and resonance.

Frost says, "Poetry is the part lost in translation."

In

Buber* s terms, a work of art can be a "thou" that addresses

the entire "I. "125
The point of using literature and the choice of what

literature to use was determined by one criterion:

what will

help to make clear the distinction between the truth that is

impersonal and the truth that Keats says is "felt along the
pulse"?

My students are middle-class Catholics who attended,

for the most part, all-male Catholic schools during their
lives.

It became doubly clear to me that we needed to deal

with the distinction between known truth and lived truth,
between impersonal truth and personal truth, between statistical truth and existential truth.

-^Buber,

I

and Thou , pp. 1-60.
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hesitate to list the literature used, for to
do so
would only add another ’’program'' with which teachers
can
I

clothe themselves.

Whereas it is important that people who

find me useful wear only my "garb."

It should be remembered

that such a list is expandable, limited only by the neces-

sity of personal appropriation and "living-in" by the teacher,

the choices must have resonance, and perhaps that the en-

counter be applicable to education.
"The Idealist" by Frank O’Connor is a story about a boy who

tries to hold onto an inner liie containing courage,
honesty, and a "heroic style."

The other students

and the schoolmaster (all in-authentic) resent his

strange behavior and proceed to kill off the boy’s

inner truth.

This story works as a starting point

with which to deal with our own inner worlds and the
battles waged with the objective world.
"Paul’s Case" by Willa Cather tells of a high school boy who

detests the banality of school and school people.

Paul’s search for glamour and human color (resonance)
is symbolized (and outrages the school people) by a

red carnation he wears to school.

Paul commits sui-

cide at the end in a way whxch exposes the grey and

colorless quality (Paul is a "case") of a machinelike world.
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"Indian Camp" by Ernest Hemingway is a story
of a young boy
who accompanies his physician father on
a medical
errand where he witnesses a Caesarian birth
(the

unjustified violence and pain of the world)

,

the

almost unmentioned sight of the woman's
after-birth
(the ugly real world as opposed to the
fairy-tale-

like world of a young boy)

and the suicide of the

,

Indian woman's husband (it is easier to die sometimes than to go on living)

•

On the way home the

boy wants to ask his father some very existential

questions about the truth of such a world but sud-

denly retreats once again into inauthentic boy-hood.

Buried Life

by M. Arnold is a poem portraying the hidden

life in man, a life that is usually denied.

"Bartleby the Scrivener" by Herman Melville is a story of

existential estrangement of

a clerk in a

world which

has walled in (takes place on Wall Street) the human

parts of people.
"The Birthmark" by Nathaniel Hawthorne tells of a scientist

who reaches for perfection by removing a birthmark
from his otherwise perfect wife.

She dies (while a

crippled and deformed assistant smiles) suggesting
the existential idea that humans can have perfection
but at the expense of life.
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"The Meaning of Awareness" by Joseph Wood
Krutch who, as

I

mentioned earlier, is so good at revealing
the human
spaces which belong to the meta-scientif ic
realm of
being.
"The Open Boat" by Stephen Crane tells of five
shipwrecked
on the open and vast sea who come to the
23-t i on of the

unfairness of life and want to

throw stones if only they knew at whom or where to
throw them!

Such a story opens easily into our

estrangement and freedom which go together.

Antigone by Sophocles is a play which richly encounters the
conflict between the existential and the political,
of tne limits of ooth, oi that realm which needs or

may be approached as problem and that realm which
can only be approached as mystery.

Antigone

,

for

me, brings the ultimate question closer, the one that

should inform all that we as educators do:

what does

it mean to be human?

The list is partial, examples of literature that

have taken into myself

•

.

•

and fused with.

When

I

I

"teach"

them, I do not "murder to dissect" but clear some spaces for

humans to connect and dilemmas to be felt.

We need as teach-

ers to bring these human experiences to the conscious level
in order that what we do in the classroom with one another,
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we do with empathy.

Through existential literature and en-

counter in dialogue, we enter deeply into human
experiences
and glimpse the beauty and intensity and resources of
the

human spirit which bring the "momentary stay against confusion."

Conclusion

Only the paper concludes or seems to
.
.
somewhere in the middle of this project, a presence
to man and the mystery came clearer . . . and
presence means only beginnings.
.

I

want to keep saying again and again that dilemmas

are not problems:

ing and perplexing.

the unanswerable.
comfort.

I

they are the stuff of existing

— frustrat-

At age forty-one I am still awed by

I'm only more comfortable now in my dis-

wish that someone had revealed to me at age

sixteen that running from the discomfort was indeed an alternative, but that there was a price to pay.

But instead

everyone was selling promises that heaven is just around the
corner.

Even today utopian educators make promises and

prophesies from the right and the left.

•

Those on the right

argue that people need their "behavior modified."

Those on

the left recommend that they have their "minds blown."

The

first can be accomplished by the correct "social program."
The latter can be done by drugs and "sensitivity" games.

Both offer a cure.

I,

as a teacher-human, have given their

diagnoses and suggested remedies careful consideration.

I
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choose the "sickness" of existence.

The utopian planners,

especially the educational prophets, will one day understand
the demands of the spirit:
ask you: What can be expected of man since
he is a being endowed with such strange qualities 9
Shower upon him every earthly blessing, so that
nothing out bubbles of bliss can be seen on the
surface; give him economic prosperity, such that
he should have nothing else to do but sleep, eat
cakes, and busy himself with the continuation of
his species, and even then out 01 sheer ingratitude, sneer spite, man would play you some nasty
trick.
And if he does not find means he will
contrive destruction and chaos, will contrive sufferings of all sorts, only to gain his point 126
Nov/ I

...

!

The literature, then, is not used to find answers
but only for entrances.

They are not to be used to offer

students any "cure" of relief from psychological labor and
pain.

I

have found that students will enter willingly into

the world of existential conflict.

They will do so,

I

think

because contrary to common assumptions that human motivation
is biological, social, or psychological, human motivation

and human evolution are directed by a psychic energy that is

meta-physical.

Meta-physical because the origins of this

energy cannot be determined:

it is an existential given!

This idea of meta-physical motivation is very differ
ent from that which is meant when educators speak of "moti-

vation."

It is not a matter for showmanship or any method

or technique but springs from a deeper source.

^26£j OS -k 0 eV sky y

Notes from the Underground .

The struggle
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to encounter and define this meta-physical
motivation and

psychic energy has occupied philosophers and theologians

across cultures and time.

That same struggle to encounter

the meta-physics of the self underlies the efforts of the

existential thinkers presented in this paper.
-~k

It is the

rans c cadence of Jaspers, the participation in mystery of

Marcel, and the dialogical teaching of Buber.

been my goal as teacher, even before

I

It has always

knew it, to invite

students to encounter their existential selves, which means
to me, to stand in the presence of and acknowledge their
own meta-physical motivation.
But this energy is not a content, nor is the litera-

ture used as a content, nor is the teacher and his prepara-

tion to be thought of as content.

There is a Hasiddic idea

that the holiest teaching is rejected if it is found in

someone only as a content of his thinking.

The literature,

by participating itself in the depths of the human soul, invites the student to do the same with the help of the teacher’s speaking voice.

To what shall we teach?

To the ’’sphere

of the between,” presence to the other, participation in the

meta-problematical and in the mystery, dialogical relating,
the speaking voice:
by non-doing.

all of these carried out in deeds and
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